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01Tackling carbon leakage
By committing to an 80% cut in greenhouse gas emissions by 2050, the UK has placed itself firmly 
at the forefront of the global effort to address climate change. The European Union Emissions 
Trading System (EU ETS) is central to this effort in the UK and across the EU, providing an essential 
incentive for cutting emissions in industry at the lowest possible cost. But this environmental 
leadership has raised worries that curbs on emissions will harm the competitiveness of UK and EU 
businesses, especially heavy industries facing a carbon price under the EU ETS. 
Our previous studies on the EU ETS have explored this issue of competitiveness and found that 
the overall risks to the UK economy are small. However, a few key sectors could lose market 
share and investment to producers outside the EU, allowing emissions and economic activity  
to ‘leak’ overseas. 
This ‘carbon leakage’ is a real concern in these sectors, for many of the companies we work with, 
and for UK business more generally. We are keen to leverage our experience in this area to suggest 
potential solutions that firstly ensure an effective EU ETS, and secondly that minimise any 
likelihood of leakage.
In the aftermath of the Copenhagen conference, it is clearer than ever that forging ahead with 
climate change policy will be a complex process in which different parts of the world move at 
different speeds, in an evolving web of domestic actions. The EU will continue the EU ETS after 
2012 as a core part of its unilateral commitment to achieve 20% reductions by 2020, and will be 
considering strengthening this as negotiations continue through 2010. 
Consequently, the issue of what to do about sectors that are considered to be exposed to potential 
competitive disadvantage and carbon leakage remains as potent as ever. In December 2009 the 
EU adopted a lengthy list of sectors deemed to be potentially ‘at risk of carbon leakage’, and 2010 
is the year in which it must decide what to do about them. Similar debates will also be played out 
in the US and other countries as they move to adopt domestic cap-and-trade legislation. 
This study builds on our earlier work on competitiveness impacts and carbon leakage (see inside 
back cover for full list of these previous publications). It contains more detailed analysis reinforcing 
the conclusion that the problem is limited in scope and scale, but it nevertheless could undermine 
the effectiveness of the EU ETS in key and high-emitting sectors. 
We are grateful to Climate Strategies who provided much of the underlying research that we used 
to develop this report. 
Michael Grubb 
Adviser and former Chief Economist, the Carbon Trust
Thomas Counsell 
Strategy Manager, the Carbon Trust
March 2010
With special thanks to Susanne Dröge, leader of the Climate Strategies project on ‘Tackling Carbon Leakage 
in a World of Unequal Carbon Prices’, and to Tom Brewer and Dora Fazekas for additional assistance. 
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Key findings
The ultimate ‘first best’ approach to tackling CO2 
emissions from manufacturing would include all 
countries introducing equivalent carbon costs into 
production of all traded goods. However, the climate 
negotiations in Copenhagen underlined the difficulty 
of getting 180 countries to agree to equal and 
simultaneous action; it is increasingly clear that 
national and regional climate policies cannot wait for 
global action if we hope to solve the climate problem. 
Yet differential action generates concerns that carbon-
intensive producers might move outside of regions 
imposing a carbon cost, causing carbon emissions and 
economic activity to ‘leak’ outside of these regions. 
Such carbon leakage is a real concern for some 
strategically important sectors in the UK and broader 
EU, but tackling the issue while preserving the strength 
and effectiveness of policies like the European Union 
Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) is difficult. The 
European Commission has classified 164 sectors – 
representing over three-quarters of manufacturing 
emissions under the EU ETS – as ‘at risk of carbon 
leakage’. If all of these sectors were granted free 
allowances to compensate them for this risk, the 
economic incentives to invest in low carbon 
manufacturing would be greatly weakened. 
To uphold the strength of the carbon price signal in the 
EU ETS, its design should reflect that the scale of any 
leakage will actually be small, but concentrated in a few 
sectors. For instance: implementing the current EU ETS 
Phase III targets to 2020 without any free allocation of 
allowances or protection would drive less than 2% of 
emissions abroad, but this average disguises that, for 
instance, 5-10% of cement or steel emissions (and 
production) might leak, and leakage from coastal  
areas may be greater than those that are landlocked.
Most sectors should be expected to adapt to full carbon 
costs over time without protection, to incentivise more 
efficient practices, technologies and companies that 
can then diffuse internationally as global action 
develops. The EU’s list of 164 sectors includes many 
sectors that our previous work has shown are unlikely 
to suffer significant leakage. This amplifies the need to 
pay careful attention to the proposed countermeasures 
that are due to be decided during 2010.
Measures to tackle leakage should be limited to specific 
exposed sectors because both the main approaches to 
tackling carbon leakage carry serious drawbacks:
‘Levelling down’ the carbon cost a sector faces, for •	
instance through free allocation, is a potential option. 
However, this approach may not prevent carbon 
leakage and could retard low carbon investment  
and innovative solutions for the exposed sectors, 
increasing the cost of meeting carbon targets for the 
rest of the economy. Given the current EU emissions 
target, granting free allowances to cement, steel and 
aluminium could increase the carbon price faced by 
the rest of industry by 10-30%; whilst cement sector 
profits could rise by £0.7bn – £3.4bn annually during 
Phase III, depending on how the sector responds, 
without necessarily preventing leakage.
Adjusting for cost differentials at the border of the •	
carbon pricing zone is more effective and efficient  
than free allocation and for some sectors can be made 
automatically World Trade Organisation compliant. 
But it is potentially complex, and unilateral measures 
risk hostile reactions on the part of trade partners and 
increase the prospect of a WTO challenge – though 
free allocation could also be subject to WTO 
challenges as an implicit subsidy.
The broad debate on border adjustments encompasses  
a wide range of proposals, some of which have potential 
to be discriminating, punitive, or protectionist. The EU 
should clearly distinguish these from the specific 
objective of border levelling, which aims to include 
importers so as to avoid discriminating between 
domestic and foreign production of particular, exposed 
carbon-intensive products consumed in the EU. 
Extending the scope from production to consumption  
of key products in this way is intrinsically non-
discriminatory. The key is to develop response measures 
in discussion with trade partners that are demonstrably 
focused upon tackling carbon leakage and designed to 
minimise trade distortions arising from carbon controls.
All options within the two main approaches introduce 
some complexities, economic distortions and trade-offs. 
Where action is required, the ‘least worst’ solution 
should be adopted and this requires measures tailored 
to the needs of a specific sector and not generalised 
across industry. This implies a screening approach  
as illustrated in Chart ES-1 opposite.
This report includes in-depth analysis of the three 
sectors that our previous studies identified as most 
likely to be most exposed, namely steel, cement and 
aluminium. Together – including their electricity 
consumption – these three sectors account for 
approximately a third of emissions capped under the  
EU ETS. We identify clear and powerful reasons why 
different approaches are required for each of these 
sectors, as illustrated by the specific recommendations 
detailed on Chart ES-1.
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Aluminium – investment subsidy: 
Consider on a case-by-case basis 
consistent with EU State Aid restrictions 
and intensify efforts to decarbonise 
EU power generation, including review 
of options to facilitate long-term 
contracts for low carbon based power. 
Pursue full carbon-added accounting 
procedures around aluminium and other 
electricity-intensive processes globally. 
Use product labelling both to facilitate 
consumer pressures for ‘low carbon’ 
aluminium and to provide the basis for 
possible border levelling that reflects 
actual embedded carbon and 
rewards low carbon intensive 
manufacturers wherever located. 
Steel – free allocation with new
entrant reserve: Complement transitional 
allocation of free allowances to steel 
producers (which provides a temporary 
but incomplete solution) by close 
monitoring to establish the potential 
extent of operational leakage from 
facilities receiving free allowances.  
Work with US and others on mutual 
recognition of climate change action 
and the options for designing border 
levelling for specific steel products. The 
core objective should be to move from 
free allocation to one of three options that 
reflect full carbon costs by 2020: import 
levelling, export adjustments by producer 
countries, or a carbon-cost-reflective 
global sectoral agreement.
Clinker and cement – benchmarked 
border levelling: Pursue multilateral 
negotiations prioritised to ensure 
that all cement consumed in the 
EU pays a carbon cost irrespective 
of origin, by requiring importers 
of clinker and cement to purchase 
EU ETS allowances or surrender 
matching credits. The starting point, 
analogous to excise taxes already 
applied to petroleum, should be 
to establish a fixed ‘benchmarked’ 
requirement to purchase per tonne 
of product, based on emission levels 
from best available technology. 
AluminiumClinker and cement Steel
Political or institutional emphasis
Level down
Environmental or economic emphasis
Level costs at border
Optimise level down approach by sector Optimise adjustment by sector
Free allocation 
with a new 
entrant reserve
Investment 
subsidy
Multiple product
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Reduced
corporate/
employment taxes
Single product
benchmark based
Output-based
free allocations
We have illustrated one 
path, but either approach 
would lead to same 
final conclusion
Free allocation to cement 
doesn’t stop leakage and 
to clinker removes most 
incentives for cheap 
abatement – too inefficient
Free allocation to steel can buy 
time to negotiate complexities 
of border levelling for the 
limited diversity of steel 
products and processes
Diverse
processes
No
Potential to part-load 
to avoid carbon cost?
High direct 
emissions?
Yes
High indirect 
emissions?
Choose initial approach, based on principal concern
Border levelling very complex 
for aluminium due to diversity 
of electricity generation sources 
for smelting – too hard
Chart ES-1 Choosing an approach to tackling leakage based on the characteristics of the sector concerned
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Differences in carbon regulation and prices between 
regions drive concerns about the possible impacts on 
competitiveness, and associated international ‘leakage’  
of greenhouse gas emissions from those with controls to 
those without. Such fears have already affected the design 
of the EU ETS for its third phase (2013-20) and have become 
central in US proposals to create a national cap-and-trade 
system. The possibility of unilateral attempts by the EU 
and/or US to address these issues through border 
adjustments have prompted warnings from other countries 
about possible implications for international trade relations. 
Beyond a wide range of policy issues for government, there 
are many implications for business. Price differences may 
have a short-run impact on the operations of existing plants 
in some sectors. Without free allocation or countervailing 
measures, there could be a significant impact on the 
location of new investment. Countervailing measures such 
as border adjustments could, however, equally complicate 
the landscape for business – particularly if they provoke 
retaliatory measures. 
 
Potential scale of the problem
Our previous studies1 identified steel, cement 
(particularly clinker production) and aluminium as being 
the sectors potentially most at risk from carbon leakage. 
If EU actions were to remain entirely unilateral, but with 
no free allocation or other measures to address leakage, 
then a modelling approximate estimate2 is that by the 
middle of Phase III (2016): 
This ‘maximum exposure’ case could result in 5-10%  •	
of EU steel and clinker being replaced by foreign 
production – maybe around 15 million tonnes of CO2 
(MtCO2) and 10MtCO2 respectively, with considerable 
uncertainty. Total volume effects for aluminium are 
smaller and even more uncertain, being more plant-  
and contract-specific.
The three sectors could, in total, leak up to 30MtCO•	 2 
allowing for electricity used by the sectors. Compared 
to total EU emissions, this is less than 2%.
As a fraction of projected emission reductions in the 
affected sectors, up to 40% of emission reductions  
in EU steel production could be attributable to such 
leakage, and about 20% in both aluminium and cement; 
around 10% of the projected emission savings under the 
EU ETS could in fact be due to such ‘offshoring’. 
These estimates are EU averages and effects in some 
countries and locations could be bigger. They reflect the 
carbon price required to achieve the cap, which under the 
reference conditions modelled is only €14.5/tCO2 by 2016; 
higher prices without other changes would increase 
leakage. However, in practice, decisions already taken in 
relation to free allocation could reduce leakage (though 
they would also increase the carbon price). Also trading 
partners’ (such as the US) actions to incorporate carbon 
costs would tend to reduce leakage, depending in part 
on the design of their schemes. 
Executive summary
Different carbon prices between regions are likely to persist for many years. 
Even with full auctioning of allowances out to 2020, the scale of leakage will  
not be sufficient to undermine the overall benefits of the EU ETS but it will  
pose a risk in a few key sectors. In these sectors, measures to tackle leakage 
may improve environmental effectiveness and political acceptability. However, 
all solutions have drawbacks and the least bad solution will need to be tailored 
to each sector’s situation and be modified over time.
1 Carbon Trust (2008) ‘EU ETS impacts on profitability and trade: a sector by sector analysis’. 
2 Monjon, S. and Quirion, P. (2009) Addressing leakage in the EU ETS: Results from the CASE II model. Working paper available from  
www.climatestrategies.org
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3  Climate Strategies (2009): Dröge, S. et al., Tackling Leakage in a World of Unequal Carbon Prices, Cambridge, UK, available from: www.climatestrategies.org
4 Minor compared with other cost differentials in labour, raw materials, taxes and currency fluctuations.
A case study of Polish electricity3 suggests that  
fears of ‘carbon leakage’ in power production itself, 
particularly due to electricity imports across the EU’s 
eastern borders, are largely unfounded due to the 
constraints on both transmission capacity and foreign 
generation. However, we did not separately study 
cross-EU-border electricity trade in south-east Europe.
The relatively small scale of the aggregate problem 
implies that carbon leakage is not an obstacle to the 
continuation of the EU ETS, nor does it provide a 
sufficient case to exempt any sectors, but it does 
nonetheless lessen its effectiveness in key sectors and 
creates an important political barrier to strengthening 
and deepening carbon controls. If the EU ETS targets 
were tightened after the current round of post-Kyoto 
negotiations, driving up the carbon price, both the 
absolute and relative (to abatement) scale of leakage 
would increase (without countervailing measures) unless 
the deal did succeed in broadening the breadth and 
depth of carbon commitments elsewhere.
Indirect international effects, mediated through energy 
prices and innovation, could either amplify or offset  
the direct effects of carbon leakage arising from 
competitiveness impacts (see main text, Chart 2a). 
These could become more significant over time and 
raise different policy issues. 
Overview of options 
The clearest and simplest incentives to decarbonise  
will flow from declining free allocations, coupled with 
diplomatic efforts to broaden the range of countries 
taking effective action. The best long-term solution  
(‘first best’) is levelling up carbon costs, in which  
all countries impose carbon costs on production  
in the relevant sectors. Most proposals for ‘sectoral 
agreements’ fall far short of this at present and the 
outcome of the Copenhagen conference in December 
2009 did not secure such a global level of action. 
Global adoption of carbon pricing is unlikely to be 
politically or even administratively feasible during the 
next decade, and a world which waits for all countries 
to act simultaneously will never progress to a solution.
This report consequently focuses upon the measures 
that can be developed unilaterally, or bilaterally with 
other major commodity exporting countries. The default 
option should simply be to accept cost differentials, 
which for most sectors are minor4, thereby encouraging 
the sector to adapt and innovate. The net cost difference 
can also be ameliorated by using auction revenues to 
reduce other costs such as corporation taxes. However, 
where carbon leakage is deemed sufficient to justify 
other action, there are only two basic options: 
1.  Levelling down, by taking the carbon cost out of 
investment and/or operational decisions within the 
controlled regions. This can be achieved through 
investment subsidies, or free allocation in various forms.
2. Maintaining the internal price by adjusting for cost 
differentials, through treatment that applies to imports 
(and potentially exempts exports) as well as domestic 
producers. Through the remainder of the report we refer 
to this specific form of border adjustment as ‘border 
levelling’. Some forms would be automatically WTO 
compliant, others might require exemptions to be 
negotiated (under the terms of General Agreement  
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Article 20). 
At a technical level, border levelling is in principle both 
more effective and more efficient than free allocation, 
but it is also more complex and controversial and 
consequently carries other risks and challenges. There 
are relevant precedents however. No one disputes excise 
taxes levied on petroleum imports as well as domestic 
production, and VAT has elaborate treatment for cross-
border trade. Some developing countries already impose 
taxes on the exports of energy-intensive goods.
The overall options and variants differ partly in the nature 
and degree of international coordination required as 
illustrated in Chart ES-2. In each case, the impact of 
measures on emissions increases as one moves from  
left to right on the chart. However, this is set in the  
overall context in which policy should strive to move 
from the top left, towards the bottom right – the most 
effective actions, adopted across the widest range of 
countries possible.
Despite all the complexities, two stark realities cannot  
be avoided. One is that charging carbon has trade 
implications. The other is that failing to charge for known 
damaging emissions itself undermines the most basic 
assumption of market theory, that economic liberalisation 
and free trade should improve human welfare.
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Chart ES-2 Carbon leakage: structuring options in the wider context
If carbon pricing increases 
production costs
Subsidies or free emissions 
allowances to avoid or reduce 
carbon cost impacts
Link systems 
to establish 
similar 
carbon prices
Compatible 
allocation to 
facilitate mutal 
recognition
Level prices at the 
border to compensate 
for carbon costs
Accept and adapt, 
sector abates and 
passes through
remaining costs, 
innovates low 
carbon systems
Provide 
data for 
emission-based
 inclusion
For most sectors
For significantly exposed sectors
In a world 
of unequal 
carbon prices
Level down Maintain price
Other countries could:
Act to avoid or adjust
for cost difference
Align with other 
ETS regions to 
enable declining 
free allocations 
without distortions
Wider action 
on domestic 
emissions
Key sector 
agreements to 
‘level up’ globally 
ETS without a
country cap
National caps 
with linked/aligned 
carbon costs
Persuade other 
trading partners 
to accept or take 
action on exports 
to ETS regions
Governments 
can take 
interim action
That feed into 
fuller global action
While working 
towards multilateral 
solutions for 
leakage concerns
Measures with increasing impact on emissions
Fo
cu
s o
n
 in
tern
atio
n
alisin
g
 th
e effo
rtAccept 
ETS regions’ 
benchmarked 
inclusion/rebates
Act 
by putting a
carbon price
on exports
Note: this study covers the options highlighted in orange. The challenges around aligning and linking emission trading scheme are addressed in  
Carbon Trust (2009): ‘Linking emission trading schemes’. 
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5 Cook, G. (2009), Climate Change and the Cement Industry: assessing emissions and policy responses to carbon prices, working paper available from: 
www.climatestrategies.org
Levelling down: options and impacts
For investments where carbon costs are dominated  
by direct emissions, free allocation to new entrants  
can prevent investment leakage – that is relocation for 
sectors with high carbon costs like steel and cement.  
The alternative of investment subsidies (potentially 
funded through the auctioning of emission allowances) 
requires case-by-case assessment and carries obvious 
risks associated with government subsidy; for these 
reasons in the EU it is reserved for electricity-intensive 
industries and will be subject to strict State Aid scrutiny. 
For electricity-intensive sectors there may also be a big 
difference between tackling competitiveness concerns, 
and genuine leakage concerns: importing aluminium 
from countries where it is produced with low carbon 
electricity does not involve international relocation  
of carbon emissions (though under a given ETS cap,  
it does relieve the pressure on other sectors). 
The extent to which incentives for cleaner investment 
and innovation are undermined by such measures will 
depend in part upon whether free allocations are strictly 
benchmarked towards ‘best available technology’ levels. 
Closure rules (which withdraw allowances if a facility 
closes) may risk artificially extending the operation  
of uneconomic plant. 
Fixed free allocation, whether to new entrants or 
incumbents, may not deter operational leakage if plants 
can economically reduce output in favour of imports.  
If a plant can generate higher returns by selling their 
freely-allocated allowances instead of their core product, 
they may choose to decrease production (within limits  
to avoid closure rules) and sell their allowances instead. 
The likelihood of this will depend on capital intensity, 
operating characteristics and market structure of the 
sector, as well as the carbon price. The EC assumed 
carbon price of €30/tCO2 would make it optimal for 
cement to pass through some carbon costs, irrespective 
of free allocation or import substitution.
A sector can also profit in the same way that the  
power sector has profited, by passing through the full 
‘opportunity’ carbon costs, which with free allocation  
is likely to be a greater portion of carbon costs than they 
bear themselves (even if this causes demand to fall).
In either case, the producer profits from free allocation, 
and the displacement of production in the capped region 
results in leakage. The Climate Strategies analysis5 
suggests that both effects could operate in the cement 
sector and, in addition to the leakage illustrated below, 
estimates that cement sector profits would increase  
by a total of €10bn-20bn over the 8 years of Phase III.  
If, instead of the assumed free allocation corresponding 
to a ‘sector at risk’, the cement sector was given 80% (of 
benchmark) free allocation in 2013 and this declined to 
30% in 2020 – as is proposed for industrial sectors not 
considered at risk of leakage – then these windfall profits 
would halve, with little impact on the actual degree of 
operational leakage, but greater impact on closure and 
new investment decisions.
Compensation that varies in proportion to industrial 
output (‘output-based allocation’) is proposed in US 
legislation. This can tackle operational leakage – though 
incompletely – but further reduces economic efficiency 
and thus increases the overall societal cost of reducing 
emissions. Measures in the present legislation intended 
to prevent pass-through of electricity costs may also 
suppress the incentive for consuming industries to 
improve their electricity efficiency. 
Taking the case of cement, output-based allocation 
would not resolve the risk of leakage because clinker, the 
key and most carbon-intensive ingredient in cement, may 
be imported instead of finished cement. Output-based 
allocation to clinker production itself would largely 
negate incentives to cut emissions through the more 
efficient use of clinker, which the EU ETS experience  
has demonstrated to be one of the biggest sources of 
industrial emission reductions.
Free allocation thus provides only a partial solution,  
and reduces economic efficiency. Protecting carbon-
intensive activities inevitably places more burden on the 
rest of the economy and this drives up the carbon price 
required to achieve a given target. Modelling suggests 
that output-based free allocation to cement, steel  
and aluminium could certainly cut leakage, but would 
increase the carbon price required to achieve the EU ETS 
Phase III targets by around a third (see Chart ES-3 
overleaf). The EU approach of fixed allocation would 
have less impact on the carbon price (though it would 
also be less effective in tackling leakage). An opposite 
extreme tested in the modelling also gave output-based 
free allocation to power generators, to prevent carbon 
costs being passed through to electricity consumers; this 
(which is not compatible with the EU ETS and not shown 
in the Chart) resulted in a doubling of the carbon price 
required to still achieve the target. 
In general, such ‘levelling down’ is a third-best approach 
to the problem. One way or another, it seeks to take the 
carbon cost out of a system that was designed to impose a 
carbon cost, and this undermines the economic incentives 
that the system was initially intended to create. 
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Adjusting for cost differentials: technical 
options and impacts
Carbon leakage can be addressed by border levelling 
measures that reduce carbon price differentials in goods 
traded between countries that do, and do not impose 
carbon costs. Import tariffs are one form of border 
adjustment but may be particularly prone to challenges 
in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) as being 
unacceptable violations of non-discrimination principles. 
The main options that could be introduced by regions 
adopting emission trading schemes are to require that 
importers buy and surrender allowances or credits, and/
or to exempt exporters from surrendering allowances. 
The three broad options are as illustrated in Chart ES-2.
Adjustments that are applied at a flat rate – a standardised 
‘benchmark’ of emissions associated with a given tonne 
of product – could be automatically compatible with 
world trade law (see box at the end of the executive 
summary). In principle they could thus be adopted 
unilaterally, but international discussion with trade 
partners would reduce the risk of challenge or retaliation. 
The simplest forms would be analogous to excise taxes 
applied to petroleum and this should ease acceptance. 
Negotiation and cooperation could moreover open  
up additional, more targeted options. For example,  
an import ‘benchmark’ could be set at a default level  
of average sector emission intensities, but with a 
discount to importers that provide evidence of lower-
than-average emissions. Supplying information on the 
carbon emitted during manufacturing would thereby 
enable adjustments to reflect actual emissions, 
increasing effectiveness and creating interesting 
incentives, but this also would increase complexity. 
The most effective form of border levelling could be to 
negotiate actions by exporting countries to ensure their 
exports of carbon-intensive products face equivalent 
costs. For example, requiring exporters to purchase 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) credits would 
achieve this, whilst the revenue would go to support 
emission reduction projects in developing countries, 
which again may increase political acceptance. Such 
options could build upon existing VAT adjustments,  
and taxes imposed by some developing countries on 
the exports of energy-intensive goods. At present  
there is no certainty about the longevity of such export 
taxes or their consistency with ETS carbon costs, and 
addressing this would require extensive negotiation to 
embed such measures in a globally agreed framework.
Reimbursing carbon costs for exports from ETS regions 
raises different sets of legal issues (see box at the end of 
the executive summary). However since the EU has 
largely exhausted cheap domestic supplies of energy  
and ore, it has little inherent advantage in carbon-
intensive commodities particularly vis-à-vis developing 
countries; its main energy-intensive exports are to the  
US (steel and refined products) and other industrialised 
countries. Particularly if these can be addressed 
bilaterally in the context of US developments (that could 
impose a carbon price through the proposed cap-and-
trade legislation), there is little case for the EU to 
consider export adjustments. 
As with free allocation, the potential effectiveness of 
border levelling mechanisms depends upon how fully  
they could be aligned with the various sources of cost 
(direct and indirect) and channels of leakage (import and 
export). ‘Full’ border levelling could greatly reduce leakage 
in cement, and reverse it in other sectors. Such ‘negative 
leakage’ is driven by the impact of more comprehensive 
inclusion of carbon costs, particularly in steel and 
aluminium, which through its impact on consumption 
would serve to amplify the emission savings from within 
the EU by reducing imports – and hence foreign 
production – as well as domestic production. 
This reflects the fact that border levelling is one way 
of starting to extend responsibility for emissions from 
producers to consumers, and to this extent they also 
respond to concerns expressed, for example by China, 
that the industrialised countries should accept more 
responsibility for emissions in developing countries 
that are driven by ‘western’ consumption. 
Adjusting the system to retain carbon-intensive 
activities inevitably drives up the carbon price required 
to achieve the (domestic) cap, partly by eliminating 
relocation as an option – but border levelling does 
so much less than free allocation. This is because free 
allocation also reduces incentives for the associated 
sectors to reduce emissions, shifting the burden of a 
given cap on to other sectors. Chart ES-3 compares key 
options. Border levelling may increase the carbon price 
required to deliver the EU cap by up to 10%, whilst most 
options largely eliminate or even reverse carbon leakage. 
Free allocation tagged to output of the manufacturing 
sectors drives up the carbon price required to meet the 
cap by around 30%, with less impact on leakage. The EU 
proposals for fixed free allocation would tend to result 
in less impact, both in reducing prices and leakage and 
in raising prices on the rest of the economy, than the 
more comprehensive ‘output-based’ approach modelled 
in Chart ES-3. However, the differences between 
different scopes and ways of implementing both free 
allocation and border levelling are also large. 
09Tackling carbon leakage
Source: Monjon, S., Quirion, P. (2009), Addressing leakage in the EU ETS: Results from the CASE II model, working paper available from:  
www.climatestrategies.org
*OB equivalent = Allocation modelled as varying in proportion to the volume of goods produced (i.e. output based).
Note: the chart illustrates the impact of various Border Levelling and Free Allocation options on both carbon leakage (from the sectors modelled) and 
the price of CO2 given the EU ETS Phase III target. These compare to a ‘base case’ of pure auctioning with no ameliorating measures (1st column), in 
which the carbon price required to deliver the cap in mid Phase III (2016) is 14.4€/tCO2, and leakage is around 30MtCO2, of which steel accounts for half 
and cement for most of the remainder. Free allocation is modelled in the way most effective in tackling leakage, namely fully output-based. Note that the 
EU ETS structure would only allow free allocation to be made conditional on investment and closure decisions, not actual output, which would have a 
smaller impact on price but also do less to tackle leakage than full output-based allocation.
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Screening the options 
The choice between free allocation and border levelling 
tends to raise very entrenched opinions, reflecting in part 
starting assumptions and perceptions. However, the 
analysis here implies that there is a rational choice to be 
made that may depend strongly on the characteristics of 
an individual sector/product, and the type of allocation 
or adjustment considered. 
This is illustrated in Chart ES-1. Free allocation is harder 
to sustain for a sector that has low capital intensity or 
other characteristics which mean that free allocation may 
be ineffective, unless it is linked to output which is much 
more complex and more seriously degrades efficiency. 
Border levelling may be impractical for a sector with high 
trade value and diverse processes and products, making 
implementation extremely complex and highly 
controversial, raising the spectre of trade retaliation. 
The best way of tackling leakage, in other words, requires 
a pragmatic, informed and open analysis of how these 
relative pros and cons apply with respect to the principal 
sectors of concern, if and as they are plausibly considered 
to be ‘at risk of carbon leakage’. This pragmatic 
perspective leads to the following specific conclusions  
for the main categories, and sectors we have studied. 
Highly trade-intensive sectors with relatively low direct 
and indirect cost exposures, which may still be classified 
as ‘at risk of carbon leakage’ under the EC proposals:
•	 Any residual impacts on such ‘trade but not carbon-
cost-intensive’ sectors can be addressed by reducing 
other costs the businesses face (e.g. corporate or 
labour taxes), with any Treasury revenue losses being 
offset by auction revenues.
•	 There is no case for invoking border levelling until 
costs become far more substantial.
Sectors with high indirect carbon costs (very electricity-
intensive) which also tend to be capital-intensive: 
•	 Direct investment support, funded from auction 
revenues and subject to case-by-case State Aid 
scrutiny, offers the best option for aluminium 
smelters, and possibly electric arc steel. Auction 
revenues and policies should be targeted to support 
low carbon electricity investments and research, 
development and deployment.
•	 The wide range of CO2e intensities of electricity 
production across and within countries means  
that costs cannot feasibly be adjusted at the border 
without extensive international cooperation to 
establish verified ‘carbon added’ content of the 
product, which should be a core goal of future 
multilateral negotiations.
Sectors with high direct carbon costs (very carbon-
intensive) that are also capital-intensive may be 
addressed transitionally through allocation decisions,  
but this carries drawbacks that accumulate over time:
•	 Free allocation for blast furnace steel production  
is a viable mid-term fix to retain capital investment 
and jobs, provided allocations are benchmarked.  
It risks creating perverse incentives that not only 
reduce the overall efficiency of emissions trading 
(thus raising costs to other industries) but can  
also ‘over-subsidise’, leading to windfall profits or 
retention of old plants that could be more efficiently 
replaced by new investment, here or overseas.
•	 The strategic goal should thus be to use the time 
bought by free allocation to negotiate and implement 
WTO-compatible border levelling appropriate  
to the key product classes.
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Sectors with high direct carbon costs that are less 
capital-intensive cannot reliably be addressed by free 
allocation, but WTO compliant border levelling is 
relatively straightforward particularly where products 
and processes are relatively homogenous:
•	 Fixed free allocation may not deter operational 
leakage, and output-based allocation would need  
to focus on the most carbon-intensive part of the 
production chain (e.g. clinker production in cement) 
which may seriously degrade economic efficiency  
and undermine incentives to radical innovation.
•	 Border levelling based on ‘best available technology’ 
benchmarks for cement are clearly consistent with 
existing WTO constraints and offer a far more 
appropriate policy response, basically analogous to 
excise taxes; policy should focus on negotiations to 
gain acceptance of and implement such measures. 
Experience of adopting appropriate policies in this way 
will also help to lay groundwork for factoring in carbon 
costs more widely over time, which should be the 
ultimate goal of current efforts to establish emission 
trading schemes. 
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Supporting information: 
Border adjustments and levelling: 
legal and political dimensions
Making any adjustment at a border can involve 
considerable administrative and technical 
complexities. Despite this, various tariffs are 
widespread and some measures, such as VAT 
adjustments and excise tax structures, are already 
accepted norms in international trade. Other forms  
of adjustment, however, may raise serious concerns 
about potential legality, political fallout and risk of 
retaliation, and associated regulatory uncertainties. 
The climate change debate is now raising several 
different kinds of proposal. One is to use border 
adjustments to create incentives for stronger action  
in other countries – or potentially, to ‘punish free 
riding’. This would imply that some countries make 
adjustments at the border based on their view about 
the adequacy of action in others. Although this has 
been endorsed very occasionally in international 
agreements (notably, the Montreal Protocol on Ozone 
Depleting Substances) this is exceptional, since it  
is not compatible with the general principle of non-
discrimination laid down in GATT. Consequently  
such proposals provoke great concerns in the  
trade community.
Addressing carbon leakage does not require such 
measures, but rather a focus on levelling carbon  
costs in particular products. In principle this is 
nondiscriminatory, but expands the regulatory focus 
from purely production to include consumption of 
carbon-intensive goods. Such measures may be 
compatible with fundamental GATT principles: 
specifically ‘most favoured nation treatment’ (any 
measure applicable to one WTO Member should apply 
equally to all), and ‘national treatment’ (the adjustment 
does not favour domestic over imported like products). 
Exemptions to these constraints are also possible. 
There are a number of potential variants of border 
levelling.
Benchmarked import levelling. Requiring all importers 
of the same or like products to acquire emission 
allowances or credits on the basis of best available 
technology (BAT) performance, in ways not less 
favourable than domestic allocation, in principle 
automatically meets the core GATT principles. 
Economically this is much like excise tax treatment, 
e.g. for petroleum. In practice, BAT standards will be 
simpler and less controversial to define for relatively 
simple, discrete products with relatively homogenous 
production processes. The justification will also  
be clearer where carbon volumes and costs are 
demonstrably significant. Cement fulfils these criteria. 
The complexities arise with diverse production 
processes and multiple products. Different production 
processes or different electricity grid emissions 
intensities may generate very different emission levels. 
Political challenge is also more likely for higher trade 
values. Steel has moderate diversity in both processes 
and products but a very high trade value; aluminium 
faces the complexities associated with its high 
electricity consumption. 
Export levelling. Reimbursing carbon costs for exports 
(rebates) can be compatible with the international 
agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
providing carbon controls take the form of a charge  
or energy-related cost (for which ETS would probably 
qualify), not as a regulatory measure, and the 
adjustments are applied equally to all like products. 
In practice this may be complex and contentious, 
particularly for indirect costs such as those related to 
electricity. However, free allocations may be equally 
subject to challenge as an implicit subsidy. For reasons 
outlined in the text there is little need for the EU to 
address the technically difficult and politically loaded 
issues around explicit export rebates. 
Emissions based levelling. Trying to level carbon  
costs for products in which the carbon intensity of 
production may vary widely would require tracking 
actual emissions. Treating imports on this basis could 
embroil climate policy in long-running debates about 
trade measures linked to production processes and 
methods, which remain contentious, and would  
require cooperation.
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Unilateral actions are likely to be driven by domestic 
industrial interests and may be viewed with extreme 
suspicion internationally. Where there is legitimate 
need and the technical and legal issues are clear, it 
should be possible to reach agreement with trade 
partners. It may help first to pursue a broader, high-
level political agreement about the appropriate use of 
border measures in relation to tackling climate change. 
International negotiation also opens up additional 
options. As a step beyond accepting the use of a 
simple ‘benchmarked’ levelling on imports to ETS 
regions, higher emission benchmarks could be 
accompanied by discounts for importers that provide 
an audited trail of emissions, so that more efficient 
producers would pay less. Beyond this, producer 
regions could impose carbon-related duties on exports 
(an extension of export taxes already levied by China 
and some other countries). GATT does not prohibit 
export taxes, and countries could establish these as  
a basis for exemption from import levelling by ETS 
regions, and as a contribution to the global effort,  
to give them more stability. 
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Since the adoption of the UN Framework Convention  
on Climate Change and then its Kyoto Protocol in 1997, 
capping emissions and establishing a carbon price has 
been a goal of an increasing number of governments. 
The creation of the EU ETS, establishing a single cap-
and-trade system that now spans 27 Member States, was 
a step of international importance. Many governments 
are now developing cap-and-trade schemes, and share a 
broad aim of trying to create a wider international carbon 
market. The European Commission has proposed 
establishing an OECD-wide carbon market by 2015,  
with the ambition to integrate with trading systems in 
economically advanced developing countries by 2020. 
There are at least two distinct motivations behind this 
effort. One is to broaden action on climate change: the 
EU accounts for less than 15% of global emissions, and 
emissions from the industrialised world overall form a 
declining share, likely to be surpassed by developing 
countries within a decade or two. The climate problem 
cannot be solved unless far more countries constrain 
their emissions. 
The other motivation has more to do with the cost, 
effectiveness and political sustainability of domestic 
efforts. Any individual region will face resistance to 
taking action without others. In the case of measures  
that impose a tangible cost on industry, this is amplified 
by the fear that industries might move abroad to escape  
the controls – potentially, leakage of business, jobs, and 
emissions as well. Building upon our diverse earlier 
studies, this report examines not only how serious  
the problem is, but what might be done about it.
If all the world took action simultaneously, of course,  
the problem would not arise. The current situation, in 
contrast, is marked by the relatively small proportion  
of global emissions that fall under existing national caps 
or otherwise face a carbon cost. As surveyed in our 
companion study on linking emission trading schemes6, 
the state of development of schemes can be summarised 
as follows.
European Union: The EU Emissions Trading System 
entered into force in 2005 and is currently in its second 
phase. The European Energy and Climate Package 
(December 2008) extends the system to 2020, broadens 
its scope, and tightens the emission cap in Phase III 
(2013-2020), largely along the lines laid out in the 
Commission proposals earlier in the year7. This implies 
that EU industry will face a rising carbon price for at least 
the next decade, irrespective of actions in other countries 
and while other schemes are still developing their 
preferred design and price signal. 
USA: During the second term of President George W. Bush, 
a number of US states started to develop emissions 
trading schemes: the Western Climate Initiative (WCI) 
covers seven US states8 and four Canadian provinces9, 
and the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) covers 
10 Eastern states10. RGGI started auctioning emission 
rights in September 2008 but it only covers electric 
power producers. 
Excepting RGGI, these regional ETSs have not yet started 
operating, but have prepared the ground for federal 
efforts, offering precedent and a political bottom-up 
process for action against climate change. In July 2009 
the US House of Representatives passed the Waxman 
Markey bill that included as a core element the creation 
of a Federal US cap-and-trade scheme. The intent is to 
secure passage through Congress during 2010.
1. Why the cost of  carbon will vary
Even if all the current legislative proposals are fully implemented, the coverage 
of emission trading schemes will still be very patchy and even those regions 
implementing cap-and-trade may have different carbon costs and/or design 
features which mean that industries face different costs.
6 Carbon Trust (2009), ‘Linking emission trading systems: prospects and issues for business’.
7 As explained in Carbon Trust (2008), ‘Cutting carbon in Europe: the 2020 plans’. 
8 Arizona, California, Montana, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, and Washington. 
9 British Columbia, Manitoba, Ontario, and Quebec.
10 Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont.
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Australia: Almost the first international act of the new 
Australian government in December 2007 was to ratify 
the Kyoto Protocol, and it followed this up with rapid 
development of domestic cap-and-trade legislation, 
proposed to start operating in July 2011, initially with  
a fixed price of A$10 (US$7.40) before moving to a fully 
capped structure. The Australian Senate has rejected  
the proposal, but the government has indicated its intent 
to resubmit the bill.
New Zealand: New Zealand has been developing a 
domestic scheme which passed into legislation just 
before the Copenhagen conference.
Japan: In October 2008, the voluntary Japanese 
Emissions Trading Scheme (JETS) scheme was 
introduced. Industry associations and individual 
companies can choose to adopt an absolute or relative 
emissions target and freely determine the level of their 
target. Verification of participants’ emissions is not 
required unless a company wishes to sell excess 
allowances. Transition to a mandatory cap-and-trade 
scheme is now planned for 2013 by the new government.
Other countries in which emissions trading schemes are 
already being actively considered include Mexico, South 
Korea and South Africa. In addition, emerging economies, 
especially India and China, host a large number of 
projects under the Clean Development Mechanism  
(CDM) that create Certified Emission Reductions (CERs).  
These reward low carbon investments, but do not create  
a carbon price on existing production. 
This situation, combined with analysis of the structure of 
the schemes being developed, reveals three crucial facts. 
First and most obvious, even if all the current legislative 
proposals are fully implemented, the coverage of 
emissions trading schemes will still be very patchy, and 
not include several key industrial economies like Russia, 
or emerging industrial powers in Asia and Latin America. 
Second, capping greenhouse gases involves major 
political struggle, which can be a source of uncertainty 
and delay and lead to weakening of key features. 
Third, and less obvious, even those regions 
implementing cap-and-trade may have different carbon 
costs and/or design features which mean that industries 
face different cost structures. Linking different schemes 
will not prove either easy, or a panacea to differences in 
design and cost structures.
All efforts to create national carbon markets, and the 
ultimate goal of creating a global trade in certificates, are 
essential steps for achieving emission mitigation through 
carbon pricing. However, the short-term picture shows 
fragmented markets with different carbon prices.
Moreover, as first national steps in scheme design will 
probably lead to low prices (over-allocation; generous 
offsetting; learning costs; concessions or exemptions to 
accommodate powerful interests), it is expected that the 
EU ETS will be the tightest scheme for a while, with a 
higher price than those found in other countries. There is 
likely to be an interim period of different carbon prices 
without significant linking among cap-and-trade systems; 
even if an OECD-wide carbon market evolves by 2015, 
there will be an interim period of several years during 
which EU ETS carbon prices are likely to stand alone  
or be above those in other regions.
The outcome of the Copenhagen conference in 
December 2009 only reinforces these conclusions.  
EU hopes of securing a strong global deal were dashed 
against the geopolitical realities: US reluctance to commit 
to much in advance of Senate resolution or in the absence 
of legally comparable Chinese commitments; and huge 
diversity in the willingness of developing countries to 
consider stronger action in a context of negotiations 
which were founded on the principle that industrialised 
countries should first demonstrate leadership by 
reducing their own emissions. The outcome – a high-
level political deal that set terms of continued 
negotiations without committing to a legally binding 
outcome – underlines the extent to which different parts 
of the world continue to have different perceptions, 
expectations and intentions about their actions on 
climate change. 
Thus it remains very likely that even if industrialised 
countries can fulfil their commitments to action, with a 
broadly unified carbon market by 2015, there will still be 
many non-OECD countries without comparable carbon 
constraints. Yet, like China, they will be increasing their 
share of international trade in goods and services with 
the ETS regions. These trends contribute to a short to 
mid-term constellation of different carbon prices in 
different, but economically integrating world regions. 
These regions are closely linked through international 
flows of goods and capital but are unlikely to have 
significant linking of their cap-and-trade or other GHG 
mitigating measures by 2015. Even on the very optimistic 
scenario painted by the ambition to secure a wide carbon 
market by 2020, there will be at least a decade in which 
carbon costs may vary widely between different parts  
of the world. This study examines the implications.
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11  Competitiveness is most easily defined at the firm level. The term is also sometimes used to refer to macroeconomic performance and national 
productivity. Our focus is at the firm or sector level; there is little evidence that climate policy risks affecting national economic competitiveness  
more generally.
There are three channels through which carbon pricing  
in one region may affect global emissions outside the 
region, as illustrated in Chart 2a:
1.  Energy markets: Reduced fossil fuel use in the 
controlled region will lessen its fossil fuel imports; this 
may be attractive in terms of energy security, but the 
reduced pressure on international energy markets may 
reduce fossil fuel prices globally and this could 
stimulate increased demand elsewhere.
2.  Industrial migration: Increased production costs for 
energy-intensive firms could affect competitiveness 
and lead to changes in operation and investment that 
move some production abroad11.
3.  Technology and policy spillover: The incentive 
to innovate may over time improve systems and 
technologies, that might diffuse internationally; 
the example of some regions acting also increases 
the chance that others will.
The first channel may partially offset the domestic 
reductions, and the third will tend to amplify them.  
Both are extremely hard to quantify and the net 
combined effect could be in either direction. The impact 
of the first channel (‘fossil fuel rebound’) is less for the 
sectors where carbon costs are due largely to process 
emissions, or coal consumption (like steel and cement).
2. Channels of  international spillover effects
A cost of carbon creates a number of desired and undesired effects: on fossil fuel 
prices, on jobs, on investment and on technology development and deployment. 
Some of these effects are triggered outside the jurisdiction of the emissions 
trading system.
Cost of carbon
Action in an ETS
Increases costs for 
ETS companies, reducing 
their market share
Tends to increase 
production outside 
the ETS
The net effect is
emissions leakage 
Triggers carbon
reducing technologies
& policies to be developed
Tends to increase 
action on emissions  
outside the ETS
Increases cost of 
process emissions
Increases cost 
of energy
Reduces demand for 
fossil fuels and their price
outside the ETS
Tends to increase 
fossil fuels use outside 
the ETS
May trigger emissions
outside the ETS
Chart 2a International spillover channels from a regional carbon price
Note: industrial leakage relates to the centre part of the flow chart. The energy channel is illustrated on the left-hand side, the technology and policy 
diffusions on the right-hand side.
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Cost of carbon
Profitability
of emissions
reducing
actions improved
Undesirable side-effects Desired result – demand sideDesired result – supply side
Fewer jobs
in ETS 
companies
Increased
production
outside of the
ETS
Low carbon
technology
developed
Reduced
emissions
Relative 
profitability 
of investing 
and operating
outside the
ETS improves
Trade impacts
on import 
and exports
Product 
substitution
and demand
reduction
Cost
Volume
Operational leakage
An environmental 
problem
A social and 
political problem
Investment
 leakage
Potential price
rises for ETS
sector products
Increased 
costs for ETS 
companies
Reduced
emissions
Substitute 
low carbon
products
developed
Chart 2b Potential mechanisms of industrial impact from a regional carbon price
However the main political debate, and the focus  
of this study, is on the second channel of industrial 
competitiveness and leakage effects. Chart 2b illustrates 
how the desirable impacts of carbon pricing in increasing 
the profitability of emission reductions, on both the 
supply side (left hand) and demand side (right hand), 
may also have undesirable side-effects on investment 
and trade: 
Production costs for carbon and electricity-intensive •	
sectors will increase, potentially improving the relative 
profitability of operation and investment in these 
activities outside the ETS.
If carbon costs are fed through to product prices, this •	
may restore (or indeed increase) profits, but depress 
exports and attract imports. 
These in turn feed through to both operational, and 
investment decisions. Operating abroad instead of at 
home is an environmental problem, because it means 
emissions are generally not reduced (and could increase). 
However the potential for ‘job leakage’ associated with 
investment (and closure/relocation) decisions is probably 
a bigger political issue. If companies struggle to pass 
costs through, a small absolute cost could have a 
disproportionate impact on returns, triggering a decision 
to locate new investment outside the ETS. In particular a 
multinational company with a high degree of international 
competition and high carbon costs will screen locations 
to optimise new investment (of course logistics and 
vertical integration matter as well). Some sectors, like 
steel, are often treated by governments as a core industry 
that needs to be sustained. 
There will also be, of course job creation in new 
industries. Seeking to preserve an existing industry 
structure rather than allowing structural changes to 
create employment in new sectors is ultimately a political 
more than economic issue – but no less important, 
particularly if the structural changes are driven by 
government policy.
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12  Carbon Trust (2006), ‘Allocation and competitiveness in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme: Options for Phase II and beyond’: Carbon Trust (2008),  
‘EU ETS impacts on profitability and trade. A sector by sector analysis’, 2008; www.carbontrust.co.uk
13 See Climate Strategies (2009): Grubb, M. et al., Climate Policy and Industrial Competitiveness: Ten Insights from Europe on the EU Emissions Trading 
System’ for the German Marshall Fund of the United States; and for Japan ‘Climate Strategies (2009): Grubb, M. et al., Ten (plus one) insights from the 
EU Emissions Trading Scheme: with references to emerging systems in Asia’, reports available from: www.climatestrategies.org 
There are some differences between the ranking in these 
studies, but in general the most cost-impacted activities are 
consistent with the six main sectors identified by the 
Carbon Trust as being either ‘significantly‘ or ‘plausibly‘ of 
concern, namely primary production of:
Iron and steel •	
Aluminium •	
Nitrogen fertilisers •	
Cement and lime •	
Basic inorganic chemicals (principally chlorine •	
and alkalines) 
Pulp and paper.•	
In both the US and UK studies, in total these sectors 
account for less than 0.5% of GDP. The share of GDP is 
slightly higher in Germany and Japan, but still well below 
1% of GDP13. In the most sensitive sectors, each $10/tCO2 
carbon price they pay could increase production costs by 
more than 10% of their value-added. Refining and other 
petrochemical activities form a big sector, particularly in 
the US where refining is more often identified as 
potentially impacted. However, the carbon cost relative to 
the value-added is generally (though not always) lower 
than for the six sectors listed to the left, and trade issues 
can be more complex and specific to individual refineries.
In addition to cost impacts, various factors determine 
the potential for trade and investment effects. These include 
various factors that affect the costs of trade, and others that 
represent a premium that can be charged in local markets, 
as illustrated in Chart 3a. The combination of factors 
determines the hurdle for extra cost from carbon pricing 
which, if met, could trigger a shift in favour of imports. 
The actual premium based on product quality, long-term 
customer relations and political factors makes some 
recovery of carbon costs possible without losing market 
share, even if carbon costs equal trade costs. For existing 
facilities, fixed sunk investment costs may be a further 
important factor in delaying leakage, though times of 
recession might also squeeze margins further and make 
companies consider closure.
3. Which sectors may be exposed?
The impact of carbon prices on the direct and indirect costs of a company 
has been subject to a number of studies, including investigations by the 
Carbon Trust12. For the UK, the cost impacts were found to be particularly 
large for cement, and iron and steel. Such analyses have now been carried 
out in several countries and confirm the broad pattern of findings. 
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Chart 3a  Carbon cost impact, local premium and trade cost
Source: adapted from Climate Strategies (2009): Dröge, S. et al., Tackling Leakage in a World of Unequal Carbon Prices, Cambridge, UK,  
available from: www.climatestrategies.org
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A sensible policy response requires some effort to 
quantify the possible impacts. This section presents 
estimates of potential leakage that could arise in 
implementing the EU ETS Phase III cap for three of the 
most impacted sectors: steel, cement and aluminium, 
based on a detailed model that represents these specific 
sectors, together with power generation, including their 
market and trade characteristics14. These account for 
three-quarters of emissions capped under the EU ETS, 
and within that, electricity (for all uses) accounts for 
about three-quarters of the emissions covered in the 
model. This is illustrated in Chart 4a(i) which also shows 
the portion of electricity attributable to these energy-
intensive sectors; including attributed emissions  
from their electricity consumption, steel, cement  
and aluminium production together account for 34%  
of emissions capped under the EU ETS. The model 
separates cement from the production of clinker, the 
carbon-intensive input to cement production that can 
also be separately traded.
The analysis explores the implications of different 
approaches to delivering the currently proposed EU ETS 
Phase III cap in the middle of Phase III (2016)15. A base 
case illustrated in Chart 4a explores the impact of purely 
unilateral action by the EU (no carbon pricing elsewhere 
in the world), with no free allocation or protection 
measures – i.e. maximum exposure (for the given cap). 
The cap would turn slight emissions growth into  
a significant decline as illustrated, but a part of the 
reductions (around 10%) might be due to leakage  
rather than action to reduce emissions.
Chart 4b shows the division between emissions, 
domestic abatement and leakage for clinker, steel  
and aluminium in 2016 for these ‘maximum exposure’ 
conditions. The biggest percentage emission reductions 
occur in clinker production, where emissions reduce  
to 70% of the reference level. This is driven by a 
combination of reduced carbon intensity in producing 
clinker (e.g. improving efficiency and using biomass); 
reduced need for clinker through all the subsequent 
stages (less clinker input to cement, and reduced cement 
production); and offshoring of clinker production. Of the 
30% overall reduction, about one sixth (16%) is due to 
leakage of clinker production; the corresponding leakage-
to-reduction ratio for cement overall is 19%.
Steel production shows the highest leakage of all three 
sectors; emissions from steel production in the EU fall by 
over 15%, but almost 40% of the reduction is attributable 
to leakage. The leakage-to-abatement ratio in aluminium 
(21%) is similar to that in cement, but the absolute impact 
in aluminium is far smaller.
4. How big is the problem?
New modelling suggests that on the one hand, for the EU as a whole, less than 
2% of emissions will ‘leak’ while on the other hand, in the steel sector 40%  
of its expected emissions reductions may be delivered by shifting production 
outside the EU ETS – if there is only pure auctioning with no free allocation  
or border levelling.
14  For the four sectors covered, the model (CASE II) includes most of the key factors relevant to an assessment of carbon leakage: impacts of carbon costs 
on overall cost structures; basic market structure of the sector (within EU and trade), including to allow capital cost recovery; regional markets; transport 
costs; abatement costs; and key product and process differentiation, including representation of clinker production as a separate industry that inputs to 
cement production. It also of course models international trade between the EU and the rest of the world in cement, aluminium and steel.
15 i.e. uses the linear decline of 1.74% required to deliver the 21% EU ETS sector reductions by 2020. 
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16  Cook, G. (2009), Climate Change and the Cement Industry: assessing emissions and policy responses to carbon prices, working paper available from: 
www.climatestrategies.org
It is ultimately a matter of political judgement as to 
whether such leakage rates matter. In absolute terms,  
the emissions leakage under these conditions represents 
less than 2% of EU emissions. However, relative to the 
scale of individual sectors, it represents about 5% of 
production in steel and cement across the EU, and of 
course this would tend to be much more concentrated  
in some countries (and regions) than others. Particularly 
if this were reflected as relocation of investment, this 
could make it a big political issue. In environmental 
terms, the aggregate effectiveness of the EU ETS is  
not much undermined – but if 20-40% of the apparent 
abatement in the most exposed sectors is actually 
leakage, that clearly weakens the effectiveness of the 
instrument in these sectors. 
If carbon prices were higher than the results modelled 
(perhaps with the EU moving to tougher cutbacks), these 
‘base case’ impacts would be increased. Other studies  
of cement find leakage-to-reduction ratios of up to 40% 
for a carbon price of €50/tCO2 (though the authors 
acknowledge this result as quite extreme), and around 
50% for carbon prices of €100-150/tCO2 for EU action 
alone, reducing to 25% ‘North-South’ leakage if the 
industrialised world acts together16. The debate about 
carbon leakage is thus logically a debate about the 
sequencing and duration of policies if and as carbon 
controls tighten, and contingent upon how action 
expands internationally.
Of course, in practice, the EU has already agreed 
measures to alleviate impacts on all manufacturing 
sectors to some degree (with transitional free allocation), 
and established a process for special treatment of 
‘sectors at risk of carbon leakage’. To this we now turn.
Chart 4b Percentage abatement and leakage-to-reduction ratios by sector
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The specific decisions in the Energy and Climate Package 
(December 2008), which defines the basic structure of 
Phase III, represent a partial move to reflect a preference 
for auctioning over free allocation, with particular 
exceptions proposed for sectors considered as being at 
risk of carbon leakage: 
Power generation•	  moves to full auctioning as the 
default. There are no direct measures to protect 
consumers (domestic or industrial) from the impact 
on power prices, which are considered to be part 
of an appropriate strategy for carbon prices to flow 
through the economy. However, where electricity-
intensive consuming industries can demonstrate 
a risk of adverse impacts, they may be considered 
for direct support to offset carbon costs, subject 
to scrutiny under the EU’s procedures for limiting  
State Aid.
Manufacturing industry•	 , in contrast, receives free 
allocation, defined as a share of the declining cap 
based on 2005-7 emission levels. To provide 
transitional relief, the default for manufacturing 
industry starts with them in 2013 receiving allowances 
for 80% of the emissions that a ‘best practice’ producer 
would emit for free, declining to 30% by 2020. 
Sectors classified as being ‘•	 at significant risk of carbon 
leakage’, on the basis of cost and trade thresholds 
supplemented by other considerations (see box right),  
may receive allowances for 100% of the emissions that  
a ‘best practice’ producer would emit for free, adjusted 
for the declining cap, or alternatively, importers may be 
required to buy allowances.
5. The EU approach to classifying  
‘sectors at risk’
The default approach to allocation in the EU to date has been defined by free 
allocation. Debate in the development of the Phase III proposals led to a change 
in the underlying allocation philosophy, recognising the benefits of auctioning  
in principle but ‘risk of carbon leakage’ is widely deemed to negate this for 
‘exposed’ sectors. 
Thresholds for classifying 
sectors at risk
The identification of ‘sectors at risk of carbon 
leakage’ starts with a quantitative assessment of the 
sectors’ exposure to carbon costs in comparison to 
‘value added’ and to international trade intensity. 
Specifically, the EU Emissions Trading Directive 
states that ‘a sector or sub-sector is deemed to be 
exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage’ if:
The sum of direct and indirect additional ‘costs •	
induced by the implementation of this directive’  
is at least 5% of the Gross Value Added and the 
Non-EU Trade intensity is above 10%; or
The sum of direct and indirect additional costs  •	
is at least 30% of Gross Value Added; or 
The non-EU trade intensity is above 30%.•	
Those sectors that do not qualify for free allocation 
based on any of these criteria, or for which there is  
a severe data problem, may also be considered as  
at risk based on a qualitative assessment. This, and 
the overall process, is set out as a one-way process: 
sectors classified under the quantitative criteria  
do not have to pass any other tests, the list of 
‘sectors at risk’ can be added to on the basis of 
qualitative assessment, primarily in subsequent 
(5-yearly) assessments.
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Chart 5a EC classification of sectors at risk of carbon leakage
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Note: the chart illustrates the agreed EU thresholds for defining sectors at risk of carbon leakage in terms of carbon cost impacts alone (above 30%  
of value added), trade intensity alone (above 30% trade intensity), or combined (above 5% cost and 10% trade intensity). Dots illustrate the position of 
all sectors covered in the EC provisional assessment, with the relative emission scale of main sectors illustrated by the size of bubbles. The chart also 
illustrates for the case of cement the impact of the proposed ‘default’ level of free allocation that sectors would receive if NOT classified as being at risk, 
in 2013 (80%) and 2020 (30%). All calculations at the standard price assumption of €30/tCO2. 
The first step in the process of assessing sectors ‘at risk 
of carbon leakage’ was a first list of sectors against the 
thresholds of trade-exposure and cost-exposure, 
produced by the European Commission in July 2009.  
This was adopted, largely unchanged, in December 2009. 
The results of this, together with the thresholds, are 
illustrated in Chart 5a. 
Most sectors qualify on the basis of the trade intensity 
threshold alone. Many of these are minor sectors with 
specialised products – the trade being often driven by 
such specialisation and facilitated by low transport  
costs relative to value. These tend not to be very carbon-
intensive sectors. However, the bulk of emissions are 
associated with sectors that do not exceed the trade 
threshold on its own, and depend on cost assessment. 
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17  Note: this does not equate to the amount of allowances given out for free, which would be substantially lower due to the impact of declining overall 
cap and the use of benchmarking.
18 This also seems reasonable in the light of the modelling estimates in the previous section. If free allocation is taken to reduce the costs that drive 
leakage, 80% free allocation would correspondingly reduce the estimates of leakage there, from around 5% of cement emissions to around 1% at the 
price estimated. Also the Commission’s choice of €30/tCO2 against which to assess the thresholds is twice the carbon price estimated in the CASE 
model under the current cap.
For this, the Commission numbers apply a full 
‘opportunity cost of carbon’ that would be incurred if an 
installation paid to cover all its emissions (i.e. they had  
no free allocation), using a standard price of €30/tCO2.  
On this basis, many of manufacturing emissions would 
be classified as being as ‘at risk of carbon leakage’ – 
accounting for more than three-quarters (77%) of total 
emissions from manufacturing, and one-quarter of 
overall EU ETS emissions17. 
However, ‘the costs imposed by this directive’ start in 
2013 with all manufacturing sectors receiving 80% of 
their allowances for free. This creates an inconsistency. 
Either: 
A.  If free allowance allocation is proposed as a solution  
to carbon leakage, this reflects a belief that it affects 
relevant decisions e.g. on investment, operation and 
closure. In this case, the default condition (starting at 
free allocation of 80%) clearly needs to be taken into 
account when applying the agreed criteria. Or, 
B.  If free allowance allocation does not reduce the 
additional costs induced by the Directive, then it 
does not alter decisions compared to no free allocation 
– in which case it cannot address potential leakage.
An alternative interpretation of the directive would thus 
assess the costs against the default case, which starts 
with 80% free allocation and declines to 30% by 2020. 
Chart 5a also shows the implications of such treatment 
illustrated with respect to cement (the impact on all 
sectors would be similar in proportion). With 80% free 
allocation, cement would clearly not initially pass the 
threshold18. However, it might do so in the subsequent 
periodic re-assessments, if and as the combination of 
declining free allocation and rising carbon prices brought 
it above the threshold, or indeed if rising cement trade 
took it across the trade threshold. 
A case can be made for either approach to classification: 
A.  The main justification offered for the EC’s current 
approach is that, in fact, carbon leakage may be driven 
by the ‘opportunity cost’ of carbon – the impact on 
marginal production decision – not the average cost. 
The ‘opportunity cost’ approach captures the 
maximum theoretical impact of carbon costs on  
both investment and operational decisions. Or,
B.  The more incremental approach implied by average 
costs (with costs rising as free allocation declines) 
would lead to gradual inclusion of sectors as and when 
justified by evidence, and would allow time for learning 
about the implementation of measures to address 
leakage, and to negotiate and evaluate the adequacy  
of action in other regions. The overall volume of  
free allowance allocation would be more restricted, 
increasing revenue, and reducing the windfall  
profits and economic distortions from repeated  
free allowance allocations. 
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Whilst the former (i.e. proposed) approach is possible  
and is the one that has now been adopted it is not 
consistent with then proposing 100% free allocation  
as a solution to carbon leakage. As explained later in this 
report, this combination could generate windfall profits 
and not actually stop carbon leakage. The logically 
consistent approach would be to link the EU’s approach 
to classification with the option to include importers 
under Article 10b of the Directive. 
At minimum, to allow an informed debate and consistent 
choice, the Commission should generate results based 
on average costs (taking account of free allocation), as 
well as the published marginal (opportunity) cost basis; 
enabling debate about solutions to be aligned with the 
relevant choice of indicator. The debate in Europe about 
how to tackle carbon leakage, in other words, is far from 
over. If the EU is serious, it is only just beginning. 
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19 Carbon Trust (2009) Linking emissions trading systems: prospects and issues for business. 
An important aim of climate policy internationally  
should be to move towards ‘levelling up‘ – that is,  
a world in which all major producing regions impose a 
cost of carbon on economic activities, particularly goods 
for international export. This would create a global 
incentive for low carbon investment whilst addressing 
concerns about competitiveness. However, this is not 
practical at present. Politically, the industrialised world 
has yet to deliver adequately upon its promise to lead 
global efforts. Moreover, most developing countries  
do not yet have the institutional infrastructure to deliver 
carbon pricing. The introduction to this report traced  
the patchy development of ETS systems even in the 
industrialised countries. A world which waits for all  
to move at the same speed is a world which will never 
solve the climate problem. 
The results of our previous studies, coupled with the 
modelling in the previous section, suggest that in many 
sectors the problems are not big enough to justify 
protective action: cost impacts remotely comparable to 
those faced by steel and cement are confined to half a 
dozen or so manufacturing sectors that account for under 
1% of GDP. For others, the best approach is simply to 
phase down free allocation, without other measures. 
This carries the reasonable expectation that low carbon 
innovation will keep pace with any minor leakage effects, 
whilst concentrating diplomatic efforts on expanding the 
range of countries taking equivalent action. In terms of 
ETS policy, this is the right-hand channel shown on Chart 
6a. It combines with a diplomatic policy that can contain 
elements of encouraging countries to evolve through 
some or all of the steps shown along the bottom, 
expanding the scope and impact of their domestic 
actions including in relation to traded goods.
However, where sectors are considered to be at risk,  
the other two approaches – levelling costs down, or 
dealing with cost differentials at the border – need to be 
considered at least for a transitional period. ‘Levelling 
down’ can involve free allocations or direct subsidies, 
as analysed in the next section (7), and border levelling 
can also take many forms as considered in section 8.
In theory, either of these can be adopted unilaterally. 
In practice, there are limitations to unilateral action. 
‘Levelling down’ involves compensation for carbon 
costs, which could in principle be challenged by others 
if excessive, and different ways of allocating allowances 
for free could still introduce distortions even between 
trading schemes. Working with other regions adopting 
trading schemes to align free allocation approaches 
would reduce distortions, and linking such schemes, 
directly or indirectly, would help prices to converge. 
These issues are considered in our report on linking 
emission trading schemes19. 
The value of international collaboration with respect 
to border levelling is more obvious and substantial,  
and could take several different forms as indicated in 
Chart 6a. These are considered in analysing border 
levelling in section 8.
The international toolbox can of course include sectoral 
agreements, on technological standards or benchmarks 
and on carbon cost equalisation. Extensive work is 
ongoing on these possibilities, but the Copenhagen 
outcome gave short shift to hopes for sectoral 
agreements, least of all ones that would incorporate  
a carbon price globally.
6. Potential solutions: an overview
Many solutions have been proposed to address competitiveness concerns. 
However, as noted in our previous reports, in fact there are only three 
fundamental options. Policy can (1) try to negate the net carbon costs 
from domestic production; (2) deal with the differential at the border; or 
(3) seek agreement to add similar carbon costs to production of equivalent 
goods globally.
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Chart 6a Carbon leakage: structuring options in the wider context
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Note: this study covers the options highlighted in orange. Global, long-term solutions to climate change will involve working from the top-left to the 
bottom-right of the chart.
With respect to carbon pricing, the underlying dilemma  
is the tension between trying to globalise action (which 
could include subsidising poor countries to adopt 
advanced or alternate technologies), and protecting 
competitiveness (for which subsidising potential 
competitors to improve their performance is the last 
thing one would do). It is unclear whether or how the 
debate on sectoral agreements will navigate this 
fundamental tension; and it is possible that solutions 
might need to include agreements on free allocation  
and/or adjustment at the borders in key sectors. Sector 
agreements will be studied in future work, this study 
focuses on the generic structural elements of ‘levelling 
down’ and ‘border levelling’.
The overall political challenge of tackling climate change 
through carbon pricing is to work from the top left, with 
carbon pricing in some regions largely offset by ‘levelling 
down’ for sectors considered to be at risk of leakage, to 
the ‘bottom right’, in which most countries have adopted 
effective national emission caps implemented to levels 
that impose a similar carbon cost. As indicated in the 
introduction, this is a huge political challenge. The choice 
between ‘levelling down’ and ‘border levelling’ – and 
how these options are approached – may also have 
implications for the world’s progress on this journey.  
It will be important to ensure that approaches to tackling 
carbon leakage do not lock us on to the wrong path, but 
rather create incentives to move the world faster towards 
more effective, global action.
32 Carbon Trust
The most general option to level down costs would  
be to adjust other costs, e.g. labour costs or taxes, to 
compensate for carbon costs. In principle this could  
at least address investment leakage, by offering 
compensation attractions for industrial investment. 
These could be funded, indirectly, by the revenues 
associated with auctioning emission allowances. This 
forms the basis of a wide literature associated with 
carbon taxation, and explains why carbon pricing is not 
necessarily bad for ‘national competitiveness’ overall. 
However, its fundamental characteristic is that it cannot 
target the sectors of concern – which by definition face 
an exceptionally high carbon cost impact, which would 
tend to swamp the scale of benefits from reduced 
employment or corporation taxes that spread much  
more widely across manufacturing industry. 
To address specific investment costs and the impact on 
electricity-intensive industries of cost pass-through in 
power generation, governments can provide investment 
subsidies. This has the pros and cons of any instrument 
that operates on a case-by-case basis: it can be well 
targeted, but may have high administrative costs and 
would be heavily subject to lobbying at the level of 
individual investment decisions. In the EU, the well-
developed structure of State Aid procedures can help  
to manage these pressures.
The most direct instrument is free allocation of emission 
allowances. This obviously offsets the direct cost of 
emissions. However as explained below, it may only be 
effective in protecting relevant operating and investment 
decisions if the allocation is conditional upon those 
decisions (such as closure, investment in a new facility, 
or operating decisions). The allowances can be 
distributed on the basis of benchmarks, to preserve some 
of the key incentives, a method which is prioritised in the 
revised emissions trading Directive of the EU. Free 
allocation is the approach which, since it comes closest 
to preserving ‘business as usual’, dominates the political 
process in both the EU and US at present. 
Investment subsidies
Direct compensation in the form of investment support 
can be used to ensure investment and re-investment  
in low(er)-carbon technology is undertaken in the ETS 
territory. This may be effective for sectors with high 
capital costs, particularly if new investment is needed 
and could be adversely affected by carbon costs. Direct 
compensation on a case-by-case basis could address 
such investment leakage, and direct payments for new  
or (re)investment could be made conditional on specific 
carbon efficient technologies or on specific carbon-
related standards. Investment subsidy is obviously  
a sensitive topic and if taken to excess could undermine 
the basic carbon price signal.
Ideally such measures should be accompanied by strong 
policies to decarbonise EU electricity. Structures to 
facilitate such companies investing in, or striking long-
term contracts for, low carbon power generation would 
be an obvious goal to align such support with wider 
climate objectives. 
It will be important to find criteria that are closely linked 
to the level of innovation and carbon intensity of a new 
production site for State Aid approval of such subsidies; 
indeed the purpose behind any given aid measure will  
be crucial in assessing its acceptability under EU law, 
whether by fitting it within categories recognised by  
a block exemption regulation, or via the individual 
notification process. Such State Aid control may allow 
some degree of support, but will also follow a stringent 
analysis of the costs involved and the necessity for such 
measures proposed by Member States.
In practice, the complexities and uncertainties associated 
with such procedures drive a general desire for a simpler 
approach that can be more widely and generally applied 
– namely, free allocation. 
7. Levelling down: free allocation and  
other approaches
Various options can be used to ‘level down’ costs: labour taxes or other costs can 
be lowered to compensate for a cost of carbon; subsidies for specific investments 
can be given, or emissions allowances can be allocated for free.
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Effectiveness of free allocation in 
tackling leakage
Free allowance allocation can compensate for carbon 
costs but does not automatically address leakage if 
allowances freed up by cutting production can be  
sold (and revenues even used to finance relocation). 
Preventing this would require free allocations to be  
linked to the existence, availability or production of an 
installation. The EU ETS allows for allowances to be 
withdrawn upon closure of facilities, and establishes a 
generous reserve for free allocations to new entrants,  
but each carries some limitations as a tool for tackling 
carbon leakage: 
Closure rules may create an excessive incentive to •	
keep a plant operating; it carries a risk of perpetuating 
the operation of an old inefficient plant, even when it 
might make good economic and environmental sense 
to close it down in favour of a new plant, whether in 
the EU or abroad. It may also involve complex rules 
and monitoring to minimise the extent of running a 
redundant plant at a low level purely to avoid losing  
its emission allowances.
New entrant reserves would effectively offset the •	
carbon cost from new investment decisions, but since 
these may be planned to operate for decades, industry 
is likely to want assurances of continuing protection 
well beyond the 2020 end-point of Phase III – 
amplifying the dilemmas around the parallel closure 
rules and other problems outlined below. 
The US proposals avoid these complexities by linking  
free allocation to the level of industrial output, with 
implications considered below.
Free allocation in proportion to emissions is of little 
benefit to electricity-intensive manufacturing sectors.  
For these, the US Waxman-Markey bill proposes to give 
free allowances to distribution companies, that are then 
subject to regulations that prevent pass-through of 
opportunity costs. This ingenious approach has the 
obvious drawback that it removes the carbon price signal 
to all electricity consumers. This may be popular politically 
and represents a general desire to protect consumers 
from higher prices. But it represents a sledgehammer  
to crack the nut of potential carbon leakage from the 
electricity-intensive manufacturing industry. 
The potential for excess profit 
The intent of an emissions trading system is for firms to 
be able to profit through reducing the emissions required 
to meet their consumers’ needs. Free allocation creates 
three routes by which firms may potentially increase 
profits without reducing emissions:
1. Any allocations that exceed ‘business-as-usual’ needs 
can simply be sold. 
2.  Increasing product prices to reflect the ‘opportunity’ 
cost of carbon may still make sense even with free 
allocation. In a fully competitive market firms may 
still add to all sales the cost of carbon associated 
with incremental production decisions – the need 
to buy emission allowances (or opportunity to sell 
them), depending upon whether output is increased 
(or reduced). If the cap is fixed this reflects the 
‘opportunity’ cost of carbon, but free allowances 
mean that companies only pay part of that cost and 
they profit on the remainder. This has happened 
in some parts of at least the electricity sector 
under the EU ETS. Giving out free allowances in 
proportion to output (output-based allocation) 
reduces the scope for such profit-making.
3.  Reducing production to sell more allowances. It may be 
profitable for a firm to cut some production – potentially 
in favour of imports – and sell the allowances freed up, 
providing it does not have to surrender the allowances 
back to the government, and the value of allowances 
exceeds the profit margin on goods sold. The drop in 
commodity prices surrounding the 2008/9 economic 
crisis may mean that margins are low enough to 
encourage some firms in the EU ETS to sell some of 
their free allowances, although in this case it is unlikely 
to result in windfall profit, just smaller losses compared 
to the case if they had not been part of the EU ETS.
Of course, potential to profit from an emissions trading 
system is not necessarily a bad thing (and healthy profits 
could help companies invest in low carbon solutions) – 
but it has distributional and trade implications, and the 
political furore over windfall profits in the EU electricity 
sector illustrate some of the dangers. Other sectors can, 
have, and potentially will continue to profit from the 
some of the mechanisms illustrated above.
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20 Carbon Trust (2007): ‘Allocation and competitiveness in the EU ETS: options for Phase II’.
21 Climate Strategies (2009): Grubb, M. et al., Climate Policy and Industrial Competitiveness: Ten Insights from Europe on the EU Emissions Trading 
System.
22 The different allocation decisions that emerged in across EU Member States in the first two phases of the EU ETS suggest that definition and scope 
of benchmarks are driven by the political power of incumbent firms as much as by economic rationale.
The cost of free allocation 
Any method in which allowance allocation depends upon 
factors under a firm’s ongoing control carries a risk of 
perverse incentives that reduce efficiency. The political 
unacceptability of plants closing so as to cash in their 
allowances, is as noted matched by the drawback that 
withdrawing allowances for facilities that close (or cut 
production) provides a perverse incentive for them to 
continue operating and emitting. Giving free allowances 
to carbon-intensive new facilities may remove the 
incentive for low carbon investments instead. Even for 
existing facilities, free allowances may distort their 
incentives particularly if they expect to receive future 
allowances in proportion to their emissions or output.
Thus, inherent in free allocation is a risk of perverse 
incentives. We summarised these in terms of a ‘pyramid 
of inefficiencies‘, discussed in a previous Carbon Trust 
report20 and extended elsewhere to consider the impact 
of output-based allocation21.
Benchmarking can retain incentives to 
improve carbon efficiency, but is complex
The EU Energy and Climate Package seeks to minimise 
efficiency losses by allocating allowances on the basis  
of ‘benchmarks’. If the level of allocation is linked to the 
capacity of a plant, multiplied by a benchmark factor 
(such as a standard emissions per unit of power 
generated) plants have an incentive to improve carbon 
efficiency. However, benchmarks in manufacturing can 
become complex, given the wide range of products and 
production processes. Complexity and distortions 
increase when recent data are taken into account to give 
a moving baseline, and rules are narrowly differentiated 
by fuel or technology type for older plants to protect the 
value of existing assets22. This starts to remove the 
flexibility offered by a market-based instrument and 
undermines dynamic incentives for technological 
innovation. Despite aspirations, few Member States 
succeeded in introducing benchmarks during Phase II, 
and the EU is currently locked in intense and complex 
debate over how to benchmark allocations in Phase III. 
Benchmarking also could reduce the overall level of free 
allowances in each sector. The efficiency criterion for 
benchmarks is set in the Directive as the top 10% of 
producers in a sector. The extent to which sectors or 
installations are short of free allowances in Phase III 
will depend upon their growth prospects and these 
benchmarking decisions. Obviously, there is some 
potential trade-off between the realised degree of 
cutback, and the effectiveness of free allocation in 
tackling leakage. However, many details remain to be 
determined; the main benchmarking decisions are due 
to be taken during 2010, but final allocations in each of 
the categories and each sector may not be finalised until 
2012. Whilst the broad implications are reasonably clear, 
free allocation will not give industry the specific, early 
certainty on plant allocations that it seeks. 
Benchmarking free allocations is no panacea: by at  
least partially taking the carbon cost out of investment 
decisions, it undermines the incentives for low carbon 
investment and innovation at all points downstream of 
the allocation point. The perverse effects are particularly 
striking in cement, as discussed in Part III of this report. 
Free allocation based on output exacerbates 
efficiency losses 
Different issues arise if free allocation is based on output 
(e.g. a tonne of cement), or equivalent rebates are given, 
as proposed in US legislation. The firm still faces 
incentives to improve the carbon efficiency of the plant 
by making energy efficiency improvements to existing 
plants. Providing the rebates are ‘benchmarked’ to sector 
average, there is still incentive to shift production from 
older towards newer more efficient plants and less 
carbon intensive energy sources, but it still obscures 
incentives ‘downstream’ of the product concerned.  
Since higher production is rewarded with more free 
allowances, output-based allocation reduces leakage  
and windfall profit potentials, but provides no incentive 
to adjust production or consumption decisions to reflect 
the cost of carbon.
In effect, benchmarked free allocation foregoes some  
of the demand side benefits on the right-hand side of 
Chart 2b; output-based allocation (if the level is high 
enough) foregoes all of them. By losing these conservation 
or substitution opportunities, the reduced economic 
efficiency increases the overall cost of meeting carbon 
reduction goals.
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Estimating impacts of free allocation
This is illustrated by the fact that free allocation increases 
the carbon price required to achieve a given target.  
The CASE model does not distinguish directly between 
investment and operational decisions and so cannot 
separate the different kinds of free allocation, but Chart 7a 
gives a sense of the potential scale of distortions. It uses 
output-based allocation as a ‘proxy’ for a compensation 
structure which offsets carbon-related costs in proportion 
to industrial output, to the extent consistent with the 
overall cap and is thus more extreme than EU rules which 
adjust for entry and closure but not production levels. 
Complete output-based allocation extended to power 
generation, to remove the downstream impact on 
electricity costs, would almost double the carbon price 
required to achieve the EU target; it would in effect shift 
much of the abatement effort away from increasing the 
efficiency with which electricity is used. Retaining full 
auctioning for the power sector, but applying output-
based compensation to the three manufacturing sectors 
in the model increases the carbon price required to 
deliver the target by around 30%. The impact of the 
proposed treatment under the EU Climate and Energy 
Package, which addresses investment but not operational 
decisions, would not be as big as this; but the underlying 
message remains that free allocation does not come for 
free, in terms of its wider implications. 
The results also reveal surprising patterns in terms of 
leakage impacts. None of the free allocation approaches 
reduce clinker leakage by much: the higher carbon prices 
arising from a less efficient approach overall have a 
disproportionate impact on cement, offsetting the gains. 
Steel leakage is much reduced, though less so if only its 
direct emissions are compensated. Aluminium leakage  
is almost entirely eliminated if policy can compensate for 
impacts on electricity costs, but its leakage rate actually 
increases if the system only compensates for direct 
emissions, since other sectors gain protection whilst 
aluminium suffers the consequences of higher carbon 
price impacts on electricity prices. 
The results thus illustrate why ‘levelling down’ carbon 
costs cannot be the only long-term option for tackling 
carbon leakage, and hence the need to consider  
other options.
Source: Climate Strategies (2009): Dröge, S. et al., Tackling Leakage in a World of Unequal Carbon Prices, Cambridge, UK, available from:  
www.climatestrategies.org
Note: full auctioning presents one extreme, output including electricity the other. The proposed treatment under the EU Climate and Energy Package  
will be between these two extremes. 
Chart 7a Impacts of free (output-based) allocation on leakage and carbon price required to achieve target
Leakage-to-reduction ratio (%)
Carbon price 
required to achieve 
target €/tCO2e 
Steel Clinker Aluminium
No free allocation 14.4 38.9 16 21.2
All sectors (including electricity) 
given free allocation in proportion  
to their production
27.0 4.6 14.9 1.6
Electricity generation given no  
free allocation. Manufacturing  
sectors given free allocation for  
direct emissions in proportion  
to their production
20.2 12.9 13.6 23.4
Electricity generation given no free 
allocation. Manufacturing sectors 
given free allocation for direct and 
indirect emissions in proportion  
to their production
21.0 4.2 14.8 0
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The concept of border levelling is simple. Trade-exposed 
industries with a high carbon cost impact could be 
compensated at the border for the impact of carbon 
costs. By eliminating differences for exports from, and 
imports into the EU, the carbon cost would be limited to 
the territory of the ETS. The price facing consumers for 
specific high-carbon goods inside the EU would reflect 
carbon costs, irrespective of the country of origin. 
The caveats reflect concerns that border measures could 
be applied in ways inconsistent with basic world trade 
principles. This is partly because the debate has mixed 
up two quite different issues: the use of trade measures 
in pursuit of wider objectives such as encouraging 
countries to take stronger action on climate change 
(or deterring ‘free riding’); and the specific objective 
of implementing carbon costs in ETS regions in ways  
that don’t discriminate between domestic and foreign 
production of particular, exposed carbon-intensive 
products, as seen by the domestic consumer. The former 
objective is potentially discriminatory, as it seeks to raise 
costs for countries that don’t take comparable action,  
on the basis of judgements that are yet to be specified. 
But simply levelling for carbon costs is explicitly not 
discriminatory, and in principle should be entirely 
consistent with world trade principles.
This distinction is particularly important because 
developing countries fear that protectionism lies behind 
the climate change debate in industrialised countries. 
Proposed US legislation, empowering border measures 
to be taken against countries judged (presumably by  
the US) not to be taking ‘comparable action’, inflames 
suspicions that protectionism lies behind these proposals. 
Application of measures specifically to tackle carbon 
leakage should avoid risk of trade conflict, or risks to a 
global climate deal, by focusing clearly and specifically  
on measures to level the costs of domestic legislation,  
as seen by consumers of key products within the region. 
Moreover, they could and should do so through a process 
of clarification and finding common ground through 
negotiations, perhaps leading to an international 
agreement on the matter.
Despite the political nature of the debate, border 
adjustments of some kinds are commonplace: VAT 
and excise taxes are just two examples of policies 
that involve charges or reimbursements at the border. 
Border adjustments for safety or environmental 
purposes have also been accepted in several WTO 
cases. The ‘Superfund’ case allowed in principle the 
US to extend taxes on chemical feedstocks (already 
accepted) to ‘certain imported substances produced 
or manufactured from taxable feedstock chemicals’, 
though this has yet to be implemented in practice.
In terms of possible applications to carbon, key 
distinctions are made between import and export 
measures, and between benchmarked adjustments – 
which would apply to imports on a standardised basis 
(per tonne of product), and carbon-embodied 
adjustments that seek to base the adjustment on actual 
carbon emitted. Also, in general it is far easier to apply 
adjustments for direct carbon emissions, rather than  
for the indirect emissions and costs associated with 
electricity consumption. The practical options are 
outlined after showing first the potential impacts. 
Economic and emission impacts 
of border levelling
In principle, border levelling can achieve the objective 
of preserving a level playing field within an ETS region, 
without the efficiency losses associated with ‘levelling 
down’ through free allocation. Chart 8a shows results 
of the CASE model that illustrate this, in terms of the 
impact of different forms of border levelling on the 
carbon price required to achieve the EU target, and on 
leakage. It is evident that border levelling represents 
a much more efficient tool than free allocation. It still 
increases the carbon price compared to pure auctioning 
without adjustments, because it largely removes leakage 
as an ‘abatement option’ and ensures that the cap is 
delivered by real abatement efforts in the EU, without 
displacement abroad. However, the impact on price is 
small compared to the inefficiencies of output-based 
allocation noted previously.
8. Border levelling: WTO-compatible options 
for preserving the incentive
Levelling carbon costs at the border could in principle respond to the various 
challenges posed by carbon leakage. However, while this is attractive in theory, 
there are very important caveats and constraints.
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Chart 8a Impacts of border levelling on leakage and carbon price required to achieve target
Source: Climate Strategies (2009): Dröge, S. et al., Tackling Leakage in a World of Unequal Carbon Prices, Cambridge, UK, available from:  
www.climatestrategies.org
*Aluminium not included, because impact of different options would be dominated by the indirect effects on electricity as indicated in the text. 
Furthermore, the most plausible border levelling options (direct emissions only) would have negligible impact for aluminium.
Border levelling for clinker production reduces its leakage-
to-reduction ratio by about two-thirds. The effect is not 
complete primarily because of the complexities of the 
relationship between clinker and cement (cement is 
assumed not to have a separate adjustment, and thus is 
affected with knock-on effects on clinker). There is little 
difference between the different border levelling cases.
The impact on steel is bigger, due to its much higher trade 
flows, and differs substantially between the different 
cases. ‘Full’ levelling (including electricity) has a much 
bigger effect than ‘direct only’ levelling, because the 
sector is modelled as an EU average that includes 
significant output from electricity-driven electric arc 
furnaces. Even more striking is the potential for border 
levelling to turn carbon leakage into an amplification 
(negative leakage). This is for two reasons. One is that the 
impact of carbon costs (with full auctioning) on EU steel 
exports is considerable; export levelling would neutralise 
this. This allows the second effect to dominate: the overall 
levelling means that imports (as well as domestic 
production) reflect a carbon price, thus reducing steel 
imports and the associated emissions abroad. 
Finally, if the import levelling is made at the level of the 
EU average carbon intensity, rather than the higher ‘rest 
of world’ carbon intensity, the environmental benefits 
are reduced, but remain sufficient to turn leakage into 
a small degree of ‘amplification’.
These results suggest that border levelling could be a 
valuable tool – but only if it is practical and politically 
acceptable, without disrupting international relations 
around both climate negotiations, and the international 
trade system that has not only underpinned economic 
growth for fifty years, but can also contribute globally 
to the efficient use of natural resources. These fears, 
however, have to be offset by a recognition that 
international trade can also amplify damages, if these  
are not properly factored in: and thus an international 
Leakage-to-reduction ratio (%)
Carbon price required to 
achieve target €/tCO2e 
Steel Clinker 
No border levelling 14.4 38.9 16
Full border levelling: 
Imports pay and exports are refunded the 
cost of carbon for all emissions in their 
production, including indirect electricity 
emissions
16.1 -25.5 4.9
Import only border levelling: 
As for ‘Full border levelling’, but without 
refunds for exports
15.7 3.1 4.5
Direct only border levelling: 
As for ‘Full border levelling’, but no change  
for indirect electricity emissions
15.8 -12.1 5.4
Direct import border levelling: 
As for ‘Direct only border levelling’, but no 
refunds for exports
15.4 9.3 5
EU Average border levelling: 
As for ‘Full border levelling’ but imports 
based on EU benchmark, not actual emissions
15.7 -4.1 5.1
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trading system in which environmental costs are not 
factored in has no theoretical basis for assuming it 
improves welfare. 
From theory to practicality: consistency 
with world trade law
The concept behind the international trade rules  
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),  
and a number of other agreements under the World 
Trade Organization (WTO), is to reduce trade barriers 
such as tariffs, quotas, and other non-tariff barriers  
(e.g. standards or national regulation), and in particular  
to prevent discriminatory measures that could provoke 
trade wars that damage all. 
These objectives find expression through a few simple 
principles. To comply with world trade law, border 
levelling for climate policy purposes needs to meet  
two major criteria: it should neither constitute illegal 
discrimination, nor be prohibited subsidies. 
The underlying principle of non-discrimination applies 
through two key clauses: 
The •	 national treatment principle under Article III of the 
GATT states that measures should not discriminate 
against foreign producers, i.e. treatment of imports 
must be at least as favourable as that accorded to 
domestic producers.
The •	 most favoured nation principle under Article I 
of the GATT requires that privileges applied to any 
WTO Party should be accorded to all.
A country can introduce trade-related measures that 
comply with these principles; the onus is on other 
countries to challenge this if they believe it violates these 
principles, which would then invoke elaborate dispute 
resolution procedures. Prior discussion with WTO 
partners can usually negate risk of dispute over 
measures that are demonstrably WTO-compatible.
In addition, exceptions to these strictures are allowed; 
Article 20 of the GATT lists the main potential categories, 
which include that the trade rules could be suspended if 
this is necessary ‘for the protection of a global resource’. 
Such an exception requires prior agreement among 
WTO Parties.
The need for such an exception would be clear, if trade 
measures were to be deliberately used as an inducement 
to stronger climate action (e.g. to deter ‘free riding’ in a 
climate agreement). For the narrower purpose of tackling 
carbon leakage, the first focus is upon ensuring measures 
that are WTO-compatible and do not require a case to be 
made for exception.
Export-related measures face a different set of hurdles 
including the need to comply with the 1994 Agreement 
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. There is a 
good case that reimbursing carbon-related costs upon 
export could be compatible with this. However, the 
analysis in Part III of this report concludes that there  
is little case for the EU to invoke these complexities 
(though other regions may have a stronger case to do so). 
The major exports of carbon-intensive goods are to 
other industrialised countries and the focus should be  
on ensuring that industrialised countries collectively  
are taking comparable climate action. Therefore the EU 
should focus any consideration of border levelling  
on import-related measures.
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Source: Climate Strategies (2009): Dröge, S. et al., Tackling Leakage in a World of Unequal Carbon Prices, Cambridge, UK, available from:  
www.climatestrategies.org 
Policy instrument Trade policy aspects Climate policy aspects
I: Taxes/tariffs
Tax/tariff on carbon-intensive 
imports (based on a 
benchmark for emissions 
from producing that product)
Levelling of carbon costs vis-a-vis third parties 
based on national treatment; similar to VAT 
destination principle; revenues remain with 
importer
Basis for carbon intensity 
benchmark needed 
If applied differentially, 
potential incentive for 
engaging non-participants 
(‘free riders’) 
Rebates for carbon-taxed 
exports
No carbon price effect for 
consumers abroad
Export taxes Levelling, revenues remain with exporter Mitigation effects. Address 
financial needs of major 
exporters from emerging  
and developing countries
II: Allowances
Importers need to buy and 
surrender allowances
Application with benchmark based on national 
treatment: as for tax/tariff
Mandatory rule based on actual carbon would 
involve extraterritorial application of national/
regional climate policy
Which allowances are 
eligible? International offsets, 
allowances from other ETS?
Exporters are exempt from 
surrendering allowances
Legitimate if considered as a charge (as per VAT) 
not a regulation
Relates to free allocation (III)
III: Other cost adjustments for exports
Exporters receive 
reimbursement for 
allowances
Subsidy? Undermines incentive to 
internalise carbon costs
Free allocation for  
trade-exposed exporters
Subsidy? Undermines incentive  
to internalise carbon costs
Chart 8b Different border levelling mechanisms and their trade and climate policy implications
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Making import levelling  
WTO-compatible 
Border adjustments include tariffs, taxes, quotas, 
subsidies or legal standards (see Chart 8b). To meet the 
‘national treatment’ principle, the broad form of border 
adjustments would have to be the same as for domestic 
production. Thus, importers would have to buy 
emissions allowances or credits, rather than being 
subject to a charge (which might vary from the market 
carbon price). In addition, since the EU ETS applies  
to direct emissions, it may be difficult to make a case  
for any import adjustment to include electricity-related 
emissions or costs, even though these are borne 
(indirectly) by EU industry.
This reflects a crucial difficulty for climate policy 
purposes, namely that whilst emissions arise from 
production, WTO law relates to products, and specifically, 
non-discrimination of ‘like products’. How a product is 
made cannot constitute a basis for discrimination (unless 
an exception is sought). The simplest route to avoid the 
need for such an exception is then to require importers to 
purchase allowances based on a ‘benchmark’ associated 
with a given product. There are two important variants: 
A ‘best available technology‘ benchmark, defined  •	
as the best in Europe, would ensure that the measure 
could not discriminate against foreign producers  
(but it would mean that importers only paid that ‘Best 
Technology’ level of overall emissions). The effect on 
EU producers emitting more than the ‘Best Available’ 
level would be similar to that arising from a free 
allocation benchmark at this level.
An ‘EU Average‘ benchmark would have the potential •	
for better-than-average EU producers to benefit 
compared to importers, but might be WTO-compatible 
if importers had a ‘right to refute’ by producing 
evidence that their emissions were lower than the 
benchmark. This has the advantage of starting to 
create incentives for lower carbon production abroad 
– but this is undoubtedly more complex than a simple 
‘best available technology’ adjustment.
While this appears to be a simple concept, a number of 
technical, legal and, not least, political details have to be 
carefully considered. Some of these relate to defining the 
product precisely, defining the benchmark, and 
implementing the resulting measure:
A ‘best available technology’ benchmark will be easier, •	
technically and politically, where the production 
process is relatively homogenous: a diversity of 
processes, with very different carbon intensities, could 
greatly complicate the task and imply that any 
benchmark would have widely diverse impacts on 
different producers. 
In addition, the exercise will be much simpler where a •	
sector has relatively few end and interim products. 
This will limit the number of products that need to be 
precisely defined, and for which benchmarks need to 
be developed and negotiated, and alleviate also the 
administrative load, for companies and customs 
agencies, of monitoring and applying the charges. 
Since the EU is engaged in a huge effort at present to 
define benchmarks for Phase III allocation, this has the 
potential to resolve a number of the technical issues. 
However, the application would then be different: a clear 
cut decision would be needed that full auctioning or 
partial auctioning is applied to all sectors that potentially 
qualify for border levelling. Border levelling could not 
apply alongside free allocation or direct compensation 
for carbon costs through state aid, since it would clearly 
be illegal to protect EU industry against carbon costs 
already avoided through such measures. The purpose 
has clearly to be to ‘level’, to protect a clear carbon price 
incentive – not to seek competitive advantage in sectors 
for which policy already ‘levels down’ the carbon costs. 
Making border levelling WTO-compatible is thus 
possible, but avoiding the potentially complex and 
politically loaded process of seeking exemptions does 
limit the nature and scope of the measures that can be 
chosen. International discussion to seek consensus, on 
simple adjustments as a starting point and potential 
expansion, is still important – and it could open up some 
interesting additional options. 
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23  Sectors and sub-sectors of iron/steel, aluminium, copper and several other non-ferrous metals were charged an export tax rate set between 5 and 
25%. The export tax was also used to increase domestic supply on sectors facing protracted deficit. For example, the export tax rate of coal and coke 
increased from 25% in 2008 to 40% in 2009 and the export rate of fertilizers ranged, across products, between 100 and 150% in 2008. 
24  The Circular Fa Gai Jing Mao (2005) No.2595 clearly states that one major use of the export taxes was to further curb the export of highly polluting  
and energy-intensive products, should the withdrawal of the export VAT refund already in place for these purposes fail.
25  Wang, X., Voituriez, T (2009), Can unilateral trade measures significantly reduce leakage and competitiveness pressures on EU-ETS –constrained 
industries: The case of China export taxes and VAT rebates, working paper available from: www.climatestrategies.org
Possible actions in uncapped countries
There are at least three tiers of actions through which 
major commodity exporting countries – notably, 
developing countries not ready to consider carbon  
caps themselves but which export carbon-intensive 
commodities – could contribute to addressing the 
problem of carbon leakage. 
One is purely diplomatic. They could engage 
constructively in negotiations about what kinds of  
border levelling by importing countries would be 
acceptable. A logical objective of this would be to agree 
what has been dubbed a ‘peace clause’, setting out at  
a high political level what WTO Parties (in particular) 
consider reasonable types of border levelling in relation 
to climate change. This would avoid the risk of 
fundamentally political issues, about the relationship 
between climate policy and the world trade system, 
being swept into the detail of WTO dispute panels which 
are not suited for such high-level decision-of-principle. 
A second is that countries could agree to provide data  
on actual carbon emissions associated with their energy-
intensive exports. China has already indicated its concern 
that it is ‘blamed’ for emissions that are driven largely  
by Western consumption, through such exports, and 
developing countries more generally reject the notion 
that their industries are less efficient and more polluting 
than those in the industrialised countries. Providing 
verified data on emissions associated with exports would 
provide evidence around both points, and establish the 
information to facilitate border levelling that could reflect 
actual emissions on a non-discriminatory basis, 
increasing the leverage on global emissions.
A third option would shift the focus towards export taxes 
(or equivalent emission credit/allowance requirements) 
levied by the exporting countries. Export taxes are 
already used by several large countries including China23.
The list of policy arguments is long, including the 
potential benefits to them relating to terms of trade 
effects, infant industry, and inflation stabilisation 
arguments. Environmental aspects have not played a 
major role so far, but China has pointed to these elements 
and they could form an international benefit to such 
actions24. Under WTO law export taxes are not prohibited. 
Export taxes can be translated into equivalent carbon 
pricing on production, thus indirectly contributing  
to GHG emission reduction and levelling the playing  
field with respect to regions imposing a domestic carbon 
price. China’s taxes on energy-intensive exports are 
already significant in terms of carbon-equivalence for  
key products25. 
There are obviously limitations to such an approach. 
To provide confidence that such taxes really ‘level the 
playing field’ in primary commodities would require 
some form of international commitment to the level and 
durability of the measures. In addition, it is unlikely that 
China will extend export taxes to major wealth-creating 
manufacturing sectors. 
But the option opens another avenue for international 
discussion, and could produce interesting variants.  
One example is that if such exporters were required to 
purchase CDM credits to match their emissions, this 
would increase demand for such credits, amplifying 
international funding for supporting mitigation in 
developing countries, and (through an automatic levy)  
for adaptation funding. Indeed in the context of climate 
change, one of the major political attractions to export 
adjustments by producers, as compared to import 
adjustments by consuming countries, is that the 
revenues associated with carbon pricing on traded  
goods would not go to the industrialised countries  
(as they would with import adjustments), but rather  
stay within the developing world.
The potential to tap the revenue associated with border 
levelling for international benefit may thus be key  
to unlocking otherwise extreme suspicion from most 
developing countries.
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The European Union is still a frontrunner and a role 
model on emissions trading. The EU ETS has been 
continuously improved and made more consistent with 
environmental goals – a process which will continue.  
Part of this process must be to take care of effects that 
are not intended. If the full cost impact hits some carbon-
intensive sectors, there are competitors in the world 
market who deliver lower prices. 
Current production and substitution effects are only one 
issue that could occur if there are no measures taken that 
address detrimental competitiveness effects from CO2 
prices. The other is where production will locate in the 
future. It is not clear how far the relocation trends which 
already exist (in particular in steel) may be reinforced by 
carbon pricing. In particular after the global credit crisis 
and recession of 2008-2009, there will be restructuring in 
manufacturing. New investment in times of recovery will 
consider future cost impacts from the ETS. The turmoil 
from the business cycle will add to the potential relocation 
for ‘footloose’ sectors – those without strong vertical links 
or product differentiation. 
The analysis in this part of the report indicates that 
issues of competitiveness and carbon leakage need to 
be understood as sector-specific concerns not only in 
terms of who may be at risk; the choice of response also 
must reflect sector characteristics. Investment support 
is the obvious tool for a sector with high exposure to 
electricity costs. Benchmarked free allocation may help 
address leakage in a capital-intensive sector with high 
direct carbon cost, but this has the drawbacks noted; 
and if plants can be economically run at part load to 
avoid carbon costs, it may be ineffective unless it is 
tagged to output. Similarly, the legality, feasibility and 
effectiveness of different border levelling options 
will reflect sector characteristics. Overall the analysis 
of options thus suggests a ‘screening approach’ that 
is summarised in Chart 9a.
The underlying emphasis in this Chart is to encourage 
a pragmatic, solutions-oriented approach to what 
has become a highly politicised debate. People tend 
to start with a bias towards one option or other: those 
involved politically or looking at the institutional 
dimensions tend to regard ‘levelling down’, usually 
through free allocation, as the obvious approach; it 
involves minimal disruption and most easily meets 
the interests of powerful industries.
Following through the left-hand side of the chart may 
clarify the extent to which ‘levelling down’ may (or may 
not) undermine the basic objective of establishing an 
efficient incentive to tackle climate change and reward 
low carbon investment. If free allocation turns out to be 
either too ineffective, or too inefficient, for a given sector, 
this should drive consideration of the alternatives.
Conversely, those with an initial focus on environmental 
integrity or economic purity will gravitate toward border 
levelling as a way of preserving a carbon price signal in 
the face of carbon leakage concerns. Pure economists 
tend to incline towards this as the obvious solution  
to protect carbon prices in a world of unequal action. 
However, closer consideration of how sector 
characteristics may influence the practical options for 
border levelling may again reveal problems; if border 
levelling is too hard for the present, free allocation may 
be a reasonable interim fallback.
To really tackle carbon leakage thus requires a pragmatic 
and fact-based approach to the needs of the specific 
sectors of concern. That is the focus of the final part  
of the report. 
9. Screening the options 
Issues of competitiveness and carbon leakage need to be understood as sector-
specific concerns not only in terms of who may be at risk; the choice of response 
also must reflect sector characteristics.
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Chart 9a Screening approach to selecting options
This final part of the report focuses 
upon the three sectors identified as 
being most ‘at risk’ in a previous 
Carbon Trust study – namely steel, 
cement and aluminium. It also 
sketches how national circumstances 
may affect options, and the associated 
developments in a few key regions. 
The underlying question is whether, 
having identified potential sectors at 
risk, the form of any action taken 
should differ by sector. The answer – 
contrary to the current thrust of policy 
in both the EU and US – is yes. 
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26  Cook, G. (2009), Climate Change and the Cement Industry: assessing emissions and policy responses to carbon prices, working paper available from: 
www.climatestrategies.org
Cement is a relatively simple product – albeit with  
a crucial twist that has profound policy implications – 
produced from a basic process of crushing limestone  
and baking it in a kiln to drive off CO2. This produces 
nodules of clinker, the raw material which is then crushed 
and blended to produce various types of cement. This 
low-profile but carbon-intensive production process 
accounts for more CO2 than all the world’s aviation,  
by a large margin, and in Europe for about 10% of all 
the emissions covered by the EU ETS. 
It is also a sector in which substantial emission reductions 
are possible at modest carbon prices, as illustrated in 
Chart 4a, using well established processes. In addition, 
more radical innovations – spanning from carbon capture 
and storage through to fundamentally different processes 
based on magnesium rather than calcium – offer the 
promise of much deeper cuts in the future.26
Trade trends. Due to its bulk and weight in relation to 
value added, transport costs are relatively high and 
cement is not heavily traded. However, trade volumes 
have been growing (Chart 10a) and this may be partially 
due to the early years of the EU ETS. In 2007 about 7%  
of global cement production was traded and the EU 
imported a similar fraction, with imports from China  
at €450m representing more than half the total (all data 
include clinker). Cement trade is quite volatile, however, 
driven partly by short-term fluctuations in regional 
supply-demand balances, and imports declined in 2008. 
At less than €1bn/yr, the economic value of cement 
trade with the EU region is much lower than many  
other commodities. 
10. Cement
The simplest option is to require importers to buy allowances corresponding  
to ‘best available technology’ emissions on the same basis as domestic 
producers. This complies with all relevant WTO provisions, without the need  
for any exemptions.
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Chart 10a Cement imports into Europe, 2003-7
Trade partner Imports Exports
Turkey 143 22
China (P.R.) 459 1
Egypt 76 8
USA 1 63
Croatia 42 16
Russia 13 30
Total top 6 importers: 734 140
Chart 10b Cement trade in million € current prices, 2007
Source: Climate Strategies (2009): Dröge, S. et al., Tackling Leakage  
in a World of Unequal Carbon Prices, Cambridge, UK, available from:  
www.climatestrategies.org 
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27 Carbon Trust (2008), ‘EU ETS impacts on profitability and trade. A sector by sector analysis’, 2008; www.carbontrust.co.uk
28  Climate Strategies (2007): Hourcade, JC., Demailly, D., Neuhoff, K., Sato, M., with contributing authors Grubb, M., Matthes, F. and Graichen, V., 
Differentiation and dynamics of EU ETS industrial competitiveness impacts, final report available from: www.climatestrategies.org
29  Carbon Trust (2004) ‘The European Emissions Trading Scheme: Implications for Industrial Competitiveness’; www.carbontrust.co.uk; and Cook, G. 
(2009), Climate Change and the Cement Industry: assessing emissions and policy responses to carbon prices, working paper available from:  
www.climatestrategies.org
Economics dominated by relatively high operating & 
carbon costs. Despite increasing technical sophistication 
in the industry, the basic technology is relatively simple, 
cement plants are not particularly capital intensive  
and their operation is dominated by the variable costs  
of energy and other inputs. When conditions demand, 
they can readily be run at part load (or individual kilns  
on a site can be turned off for periods).
An earlier Carbon Trust study27 indicated that carbon 
costs have a higher impact on UK cement costs, relative 
to value added, than for any other sector except lime; 
Climate Strategies28 found the same to be true with 
German data, by a larger margin and with no exceptions. 
The extent to which this may overcome barriers to trade, 
notably transport costs, depends on the exposure of local 
markets particularly to seaborne trade, and of course  
the carbon price. 
Estimates of leakage from the CASE model suggest 
potential for modest carbon leakage (about 5% of 
production, 15-20% of actual reductions) at the (relatively 
low) carbon prices required to deliver the EU’s current 
Phase III target. This would be concentrated on coastal 
areas notably in Mediterranean countries, UK and some 
of North Sea, also through river systems such as the 
Rhine and Danube. Other estimates show carbon leakage-
to-reduction ratios rising up to around 50% if EU unilateral 
action sustained carbon prices around €50-100/tCO2, 
without any offsetting measures (i.e. full auctioning).
Free allocation is not an 
effective solution
Following the left-hand side of the screening Chart 9a 
questions the potential for tackling leakage through 
‘levelling down’. Free allowances through the EU system 
(or indeed equivalent investment subsidies) might retain 
any new investment. However, it would not address the 
potential impact of carbon costs on existing cement 
plants – nor indeed, on how any new ones might be 
operated. A volume of free allocation fixed for Phase III 
of the EU ETS – 2013-2020 – could invite two perverse 
effects, given the dominance of inland transport costs 
in cement markets: 
Plants located inland and protected by transport costs •	
could behave in similar ways to the power sector,  
with substantial profits arising from passing through 
incremental carbon costs (‘opportunity costs’) into 
local cement markets despite the free allocation.
Plants located near the coast might profit substantially •	
by shutting down (or running at much reduced output, 
to avoid being caught by closure rules), selling their 
surplus emission allowances, and servicing their local 
markets through imports. 
It remains hotly contested how much cement markets 
would actually maximise profits by passing through 
‘opportunity’ costs in this way. There is limited evidence 
of pass-through in EU ETS Phase 1 (in the range 10-40% 
of the carbon price), but there was little time for the 
industry to adjust its prices before the carbon price 
collapsed anyway, so this is not a good guide. 
Theoretical models29 suggest the industry would pass 
through anywhere between 33-90% of opportunity costs, 
depending on market structure and location. 
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Chart 10c indicates that a carbon price of €30/tCO2  
(the price used for the EC assessment), equates to about 
€20 per tonne of cement. Thus if plants have an operating 
margin of more than €20 per tonne of cement, it would 
not make sense to reduce output; however, the 
combination of varying cement prices and locations with 
varying carbon costs could easily lead to conditions 
under which individual plants could increase their profits 
by cutting production and selling the allowances. 
Obviously in practice, individual plants would be in 
different circumstances and supply must match demand. 
For pass-through rates in the range 30-90%, compared to 
the situation without the ETS the overall profits of the EU 
cement industry would rise by around €0.7bn-3.4bn/yr, or 
more with a combination of mitigation efforts and 
leakage that frees up additional allowances for sale.
Leakage rates at these prices would still be modest 
(€20/t cement is a lower estimate of the costs of shipping 
clinker); the point is that free allocation may not stop 
leakage. At the higher levels of pass-through, and 
particularly with higher carbon prices, companies  
could reap additional profits by selling allowances and 
importing cement instead. Irrespective of short-run profit 
maximisation, operators would have to pass through 
more and more of the carbon cost to make it worth 
keeping plants running, instead of selling the allowances. 
Cement production in the EU is projected anyway to 
remain flat or slightly decline; with the level of free 
allocations implicit in the current EU approach, the 
combination of abatement and leakage might then  
leave the industry with substantial surplus allowances 
throughout Phase III. 
Carbon cost pass 
through rate (carbon 
price €30/tCO2)
Typical cement 
price  
(€/t cement)
Typical operating profit  
per tonne cement sales  
(€/t cement)
Increase in the sector’s  
profits under the EU ETS  
(€m/yr)
0% €60 €9.9 -€754
30% €66 €15.9 €697
50% €70 €19.9 €1,632
70% €74 €24.0 €2,542
90% €78 €28.0 €3,426
100% €80 €30.0 €3,858
Chart 10c EU ETS impacts on the European cement sector costs, prices and profits
Source: Cook, G. (2009), Climate Change and the Cement Industry: assessing emissions and policy responses to carbon prices, working paper available 
from: www.climatestrategies.org
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30  Border levelling is incompatible with extensive free allocation, since obviously making importers pay costs that are not incurred by domestic 
producers violates the GATT National Treatment principle. 
31  An important variant could be to set the benchmark at an ‘average’ EU level, and allow importers to provide audited evidence of emissions lower than 
this benchmark. However, this would obviously complicate the system.
The net effect of all this could thus be to increase 
cement prices and profits without stopping carbon 
leakage. Indeed, emissions associated with servicing 
coastal cement markets would increase, due to 
production from less efficient overseas plants, the  
loss of the significant price-induced abatement in EU 
production, and the transport emissions associated  
with shipping this bulky commodity. 
There is one other option for ‘levelling down’ – but it 
hardly works. The above problems would logically drive 
‘levelling down’ policy to the last step in Chart 9a, of 
output-based allocation, as proposed in the US Waxman-
Markey bill. This has the intrinsic drawbacks in terms  
of reduced efficiency, but in the case of cement this is 
eclipsed by fact that if companies receive free allowances 
per tonne of cement they produce, they could still import 
the clinker from which cement is made – cutting their 
own emissions and still selling the surplus allowances. 
Since clinker is the most carbon-intensive part of the 
process by far, the net effect would still be carbon 
leakage, combined with windfall profits. 
Short of drastic steps (like banning clinker imports), 
the obvious fix for this problem would be to grant free 
allowances per unit of clinker produced, rewarding clinker 
production itself. Unfortunately companies would then 
face no incentive to be more efficient in their use of 
clinker in mixing cement – yet reducing clinker use in 
cement production has been shown to be one of the most 
extensive and cost-effective mitigation options adopted 
by EU companies in response to the EU ETS. Moreover, 
allocating free allowances to clinker production would 
remove any incentive for the radical innovation through 
technologies that avoid the carbon-intensive clinker 
process altogether, such as some of the magnesium 
routes. Free allocation is not an effective solution.
Border levelling is possible
Following the opposite side of the screening Chart 9a 
leads to more promising options. Whilst there are 
of course different types of kiln, cement production  
globally is converging towards the more efficient dry  
kiln processes and the fundamentals don’t vary much.  
Of course there are different types and grades of cement, 
but cement remains a relatively homogenous process 
and product. Cement could thus follow a relatively 
straightforward line to the top-right of Chart 9a. 
The CASE modelling of different border levelling 
options shows little variation between different options – 
reflecting the dominance of direct emissions, and  
the relative lack of exports. 
This would enable policy to focus on the simplest option, 
namely a requirement for all importers to purchase EU 
emission allowances. Benchmarking the requirement  
(i.e. per tonne of product) would clearly make it compliant 
with the GATT Article III principle of non-discrimination  
(all imports treated the same); and setting the benchmark 
at a level of ‘best available technology’ utilised in Europe 
would comply with the GATT Article 1 National Treatment 
requirement, assuming that any free allocation accorded 
to domestic producers is similarly extended to importers30. 
This would effectively tackle the problem of carbon 
leakage from impacts on imports into the EU and retain 
the incentive for EU producers to cut their emissions 
through all the economic options available. Moving 
towards auctioning (otherwise, there would be nothing  
to charge importers anyway) would also address the 
problem of windfall profits. 
This approach avoids any need for the EU to probe  
into how cement is produced elsewhere (‘process and 
production methods’ form a complex and difficult terrain 
in the WTO). Other variants could be considered to start 
creating related incentives, in which efficient producers 
could make a case for a lower level of adjustment to be 
applied, providing an incentive to maximise efficiency 
and provide an audited trail of carbon emissions31. 
In practice, the sector would probably require two 
benchmarked border levelling mechanisms, one 
for clinker and one for cement itself. The relative 
homogeneity of the product would make such 
levelling relatively simple to implement on a basis 
of default benchmark carbon intensity. 
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Conclusion for cement
The characteristics of cement make it hard or impossible 
to ‘level down’ carbon costs without losing many of the 
relevant incentives on the industry to decarbonise. At the 
same time, it is not hard to design a system that includes 
a basic level of carbon cost in all cement sold in the EU, 
wherever it is produced. The simplest option, requiring 
importers to buy allowances corresponding to ‘best 
available technology’ emissions on the same basis as 
domestic producers, complies with all relevant WTO 
provisions, without the need for any exemptions. 
Moreover, cement is not (yet) very heavily traded  
and the value at stake is not huge – indeed, a number  
of developing countries have themselves imposed export 
tariffs to prevent cement exports ‘overheating’ domestic 
production on the basis of volatile export markets.  
All these factors greatly reduce the risk of any country 
attempting to invoke WTO dispute procedures or  
counter measures. 
Finally, policymakers could choose to ignore the issue  
for cement, classify it as a sector not exposed to carbon 
leakage and subject it to steadily declining free allocation 
without any border levelling. This option unfortunately 
would have highly unequal consequences across the EU, 
with particularly severe impact on cement industries in 
the Mediterranean region, but also the UK, and some 
east European countries exposed to imports across the 
border or through imports from the Black Sea and up the 
Danube. This is hardly an attractive political, or indeed 
environmental, proposition. 
A policy of free allocation that creates windfall profits  
in some regions, and industrial losses in others, without 
solving the leakage problem, is hardly attractive. 
Therefore, the particular characteristics of cement 
appear to make the best – maybe the only effective – 
option to include cement importers in the EU ETS. 
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Steel is a bigger emitter than cement, accounting for 8% 
of global CO2 emissions and almost 20% of emissions 
covered by the EU ETS, about two thirds of this being 
direct and the remainder due to its equally prodigious 
electricity consumption. It is also a huge and powerful 
industry in all the major industrial regions. 
Steel has over recent years become a highly traded 
product – sufficiently so that its trade level in 2007 
exceeded even the ‘trade intensity alone’ threshold for 
sectors at risk classification in the EC. Consequently, it is 
inevitably classified as a sector at risk. It is also a high-
value commodity. Combined, these are reflected in the 
trade values in Chart 11a. The value of imports from the 
top 6 approached almost €20bn, with China and Russia 
together accounting for over half of this. Exports exceed 
€12bn, principally to the US and Turkey. 
11. Steel
Free allocation is a plausible short-term response for steel, and border levelling 
would be complex and contentious. But to prevent steel getting ‘locked in’ to the 
suboptimal incentives created by free allocation, no later than the second half of 
this decade, one of three other options will need to be negotiated, for 
implementation by about 2020. 
Trade partner Imports Exports
China 6,547 1,902
Turkey 2,306 4,254
Russia 5,280 720
USA 1,355 3,411
Ukraine 3,054 262
Switzerland 729 2,126
Total top 6 importers 19,271 12,675
Chart 11a  Basic iron & steel and ferro-alloys EU trade 
in million € current prices, 2007
Source: Climate Strategies (2009): Dröge, S. et al., Tackling Leakage  
in a World of Unequal Carbon Prices, Cambridge, UK, available from: 
www.climatestrategies.org
The trade trends reflect consolidation of the international 
industry that has heightened fears about the potential 
impact of carbon costs on the industry. The CASE results 
find steel to have the highest carbon leakage-to-reduction 
ratio, twice that of cement or aluminium. Steel is a high 
emitting, powerful industry with a lot at stake, even more 
so in other regions like the US and Japan. Ignoring 
leakage is not a viable option. 
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Economics dominated by capital costs 
and two main production routes with 
varied products
The principal means for manufacturing steel are blast 
oxygen furnaces (BOF), and Electric Arc Furnaces (EAF) 
for recycling scrap metal. These plants are highly capital 
intensive, lasting for decades, and the direct impact of 
any given carbon cost on BOF operating cost is amongst 
the highest of any sector. The high capital cost means 
that the operating margins are usually high (to recoup 
capital investment), making it less likely that plants will 
be run below capacity to minimise (or maximise) carbon-
related costs (or profits). 
Electric arc furnaces, used for scrap metal processing, 
are much less carbon-intensive but constrained by scrap 
metal supply. A third route of production is direct iron 
reduction, with variable emissions depending on the 
energy source (coal or gas); these tend to be smaller  
and are used extensively in India for example, but only 
account for a small proportion of global steel production. 
Primary steel products fall into two main classes,  
‘flat steel’ (e.g. for vehicles) and ‘long steel’ (e.g. for 
construction), usually but not exclusively associated with 
the two main corresponding processes (respectively blast 
furnace, and electric arc). There are many different types 
and grades of steel, though various trade-related 
measures (such as EU quotas) have successfully defined 
particular product types for regulatory purposes.
Emissions from electric arc plants obviously vary 
according to the source of electricity used, as well as other 
factors. Blast furnace plants are more homogenous but 
the emissions intensity of plants still varies considerably 
within Europe and around the world. There are various 
abatement options, ranging from incremental to radical.  
A full analysis is being undertaken for a subsequent 
Carbon Trust study, but the basic characteristics 
sketched above enable primary insights into how steel  
fits into the screening process of Chart 9a. 
Free allocation for blast furnace, 
and investment subsidy for electric arc, 
may tackle the core problem for 
a limited period
Following the logic of Chart 9a, the capital intensity of 
steel plants implies a focus upon capacity – the risk of 
plant closure and the location of new investment. The 
dominant political problem is a risk of induced closure 
leading to investments going abroad, in a sector already 
under strong pressure to compete with lower cost 
outputs, notably in regions close to iron ore deposits.
In the absence of carbon pricing in competing regions, 
this risk can be addressed by free allocation for new 
entrants and closure provisions. Direct compensation 
(subject to state aid constraints) could in theory deliver 
the same effect, but in a much more complex way; the 
case for such support for Electric Arc plants deserves 
scrutiny, but the primary leakage problem is from blast 
furnace steel.
If investment leakage is the primary route, Chart 11b 
suggests that free allocation could greatly reduce – 
though not entirely prevent – this, even though focused 
on direct emissions only. The added impact of 
addressing indirect costs, or also addressing exports 
through full reimbursement of carbon costs appear 
modest in comparison. 
To ensure that any new facilities are ‘state of the art’ in 
terms of energy and carbon efficiency, it is important that 
any such allocations be benchmarked on the basis of steel 
output, rather than plant-specific. This will not be easy, 
given different types and grades of steel output, but if 
not, even more of the desired incentives will be lost. 
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Important additional complexities arise partly from  
the existence of alternate production processes. Free 
allocation to blast furnace plants may amplify the case 
for direct compensation to electric arc plants to prevent 
a perverse incentive. This illustrates one generic 
drawback with free allocation: it tends to have knock-on 
effects that create additional complexities elsewhere,  
as one form of subsidy is needed to level conditions in 
the face of another. 
It remains unclear the extent to which free allocation 
might lead to windfall profits and operational leakage, 
with steel plants passing through the opportunity cost  
of carbon, cutting back their production in favour of 
imports, and selling allowances. Certainly the scope for 
this appears much more limited than for cement; the 
higher trade intensity will place much more pressure 
to keep prices down, and the much higher value-added 
of the product will deter part-loading. However, if and 
as carbon prices rise, this would become a problem at 
some stage. Output-based allocation would address this 
but introduce the other problems noted. The likelihood 
of this approach in the US could cause friction and 
this should be ‘on the table’ of discussions about 
coordinating their trading systems.
From a carbon perspective there are also other 
significant drawbacks to free allocation which would tend 
to accumulate, in addition to the general loss of efficiency 
due to protection of ‘downstream’ markets from carbon 
prices in steel. Most notably, the historic decline in EU 
steel production reflects the fact that Europe has neither 
iron ore nor cheap energy; it has no natural advantage. 
Migration of steel production to other regions is a 
perfectly natural economic process, reflecting their 
comparative advantages, which in the long run can both 
reduce costs to the rest of EU industry and probably 
global emissions as well. There is a real risk of free 
allocation providing an inappropriate level of incentive to 
retain steel production in Europe. If old plants that should 
close remain open (at low operating levels) to retain their 
allowances, and if new investments lasting for decades 
are promised protection from carbon costs over such 
periods, this will not only reduce incentives for efficient 
investment, but impede appropriate and beneficial 
restructuring of the EU economy.
To avoid accumulation of such problems and retain the 
longer term signals, it is therefore important that any 
policy of free allocation is of limited duration, beyond 
which the industry does face the real cost of carbon.  
This will remain problematic if there is not global action.
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Chart 11b Steel sector leakage-to-reduction ratios under free allocation and border levelling
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Border levelling faces serious 
complexities – and high politics
On the surface therefore, border levelling mechanisms 
appear more attractive. Chart 11b illustrates their 
theoretical potential not merely to tackle carbon leakage, 
but to exert leverage that amplifies EU reductions with 
reductions elsewhere; full scope levelling could both 
lower EU steel demand and create incentives for foreign 
producers to decarbonise their production for EU 
markets. However, the least difficult option – on direct 
emissions for imports only – appears little more effective 
than the equivalent output-based free allocation. 
Part of the advantage of the ‘full border levelling’  
option is that it avoids displacement of EU steel exports. 
However, because major exports from the EU are to 
the US, there would be no case for the EU to consider 
the complexities of export compensation/levelling 
providing the EU and US can align allocation and leakage 
measures. The EU could address any issues around the 
similarly large exports to Turkey and through Switzerland 
as part of regional integration (e.g. Switzerland is already 
on track to join the EU ETS).
Yet considering the right-hand side of the screening 
Chart 9a suggests that even the simplest option – 
requiring importers to purchase allowances associated 
with direct emissions – faces serious complications due 
to the co-existence of different production processes and 
the diversity of types of steel products. A single ‘flat rate’ 
benchmarked border levelling mechanism on all steel 
would have profoundly diverging effects on different 
importers. A benchmark set at the emission level of 
electric arc furnaces would also do little to harmonise the 
costs compared to blast furnace steel production. To be 
effective, the benchmark would either have to be set at 
blast furnace levels – risking trade disputes on the 
grounds of giving EU electric arc furnaces preferential 
treatment – or have to be differentiated according to the 
production process used in other regions, an even more 
contentious proposition at this stage. 
The different products would also create huge pressures 
to create a diversity of border levelling. It might be 
possible to adopt one adjustment for long steel produced 
from electric arcs, and another for flat products produced 
from blast furnaces; this could be studied more closely. 
But there is clearly a risk that, at least in the absence of a 
clear framework of verified carbon flows, attempts to 
differentiate processes and product benchmarks could 
be complex and contentious.
These challenges tend to confirm the likelihood that 
policy will gravitate to free allocation, notwithstanding 
its technical complexities and efficiency losses. This 
tendency would be reinforced by the fact that steel trade 
is large in terms of economic value and border levelling 
would be politically extremely sensitive (though the 
same could apply to output-based compensation if  
other countries sought to challenge this as a  
production subsidy). 
Nevertheless, it is the relative diversity of process  
and products that would increase the value of effective 
action, if this leads major steel producers to take account 
of carbon costs. An effective international agreement 
would reward investment in lower carbon facilities  
and production choices, including increased recycling. 
This would apply first with respect to new investment 
– for example, if major companies agreed to apply 
‘shadow carbon costs’ for investment appraisal – but  
also increasingly over time, in actual operation. Given  
the large scale of steel sector emissions, progress 
towards a meaningful international action in steel could 
yield significant environmental (and ultimately economic) 
benefits. The challenge is in devising an effective interim 
strategy, and creating the incentives for all producers 
ultimately to reach an effective agreement.
Conclusions for steel 
Free (fixed) allocation with new entrant reserve and 
closure rules may tackle the majority of the leakage 
problem and offers a plausible interim approach for the 
EU (perhaps to 2020), but it will provide an incomplete 
solution, and result in increasing problems the longer 
it is sustained. To prevent steel getting ‘locked in’ to the 
suboptimal incentives created by free allocation, no later 
than the second half of this decade, one of the following 
three options will need to be negotiated, for 
implementation by about 2020:
Border levelling for steel imported into regions •	
imposing a carbon cost possibly together with 
carbon rebates on steel exported to countries not 
taking equivalent action.
Specific agreements with principal producer regions •	
(e.g. Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Brazil, South Africa) 
for them to impose carbon charges on steel exports.
A global sectoral agreement imposing carbon costs on •	
steel production in all significant producer countries.
Establishing the most attractive and plausible of these 
options is beyond the scope of this study, but it should be 
clearly established that free allocation is a temporary fix 
that should be withdrawn as soon as a better alternative 
is in place – and no later than about 2020. 
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The third of the three sectors studied, aluminium is very 
different again. The industry has made strong efforts to 
reduce the exceptionally long-lived process emissions, 
leaving the dominant emissions from modern aluminium 
plants as the CO2 associated with the electricity that such 
plants consume in prodigious quantities; at the current 
EU grid average, the two together account for around 
85MtCO2e, or around 4% of EU ETS emissions. 
Trade partner Imports Exports
Norway 4,307 324
Russia 2,474 406
Switzerland 1,016 889
USA 540 1,054
China (P.R.) 633 678
Mozambique 1,169 1
Total top 6 importers: 10,139 3,352
Chart 12a  Aluminium EU trade in million € current 
prices, 2007 
Source: Climate Strategies (2009): Dröge, S. et al., Tackling Leakage  
in a World of Unequal Carbon Prices, Cambridge, UK, available from:  
www.climatestrategies.org
12. Aluminium
The only effective way to reduce emissions from aluminium while avoiding 
carbon leakage may involve investment support. While helping to offset carbon 
costs in new investment, the main focus should be upon supporting upgrading  
to best technology and encouraging the use of low carbon electricity, without 
deterring appropriate restructuring of the sector.
Europe imports a high and growing proportion of its 
aluminium; domestic production is extensively based on 
recycling, but with a number of primary smelters. Carbon 
costs will impact mostly through electricity prices and in 
the short term this will vary considerably according to 
how smelters get their electricity – some own power 
plants (nuclear or coal), others have power purchase 
contracts with specific stations or with the grid, but most 
contracts will expire during the 2010s. 
Although the impact of carbon costs on primary 
smelters, as a fraction of value added, is smaller than for 
cement or steel, it is much harder for aluminium to pass 
through any costs; as outlined in our previous report, 
aluminium is a homogenous, high-value product with  
a price largely set globally. This makes the industry 
potentially very exposed. 
There is only one viable option for 
‘levelling down’ in the EU
Due to its high electricity intensity, aluminium follows the 
branch of the screening Chart 9a that leads to investment 
subsidies as the main option for taking out the cost of 
carbon. Like steel, aluminium plants are relatively capital 
intensive, and there are more severe technical constraints 
on part-loading. There is little prospect that plants would 
run below capacity for extended periods and no risk of 
windfall profits.
As with steel but more so, the EU has no international 
comparative advantage in producing aluminium, which 
naturally gravitates towards regions with very cheap 
energy. This includes regions like Norway and Iceland 
where emissions are very much lower. Consequently,  
for this sector concerns about competitiveness are not 
closely tied to carbon leakage. If an aluminium smelter 
powered by a brown coal-based station closes in favour 
of a hydro-based plant abroad, that is an entirely 
appropriate and natural consequence of tackling  
CO2 emissions. So long as the EU ETS cap is reduced  
as a consequence, then no leakage will occur.
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The main risk indeed is that of inappropriately supporting 
continued production in the EU. However, without the 
blanket support of free allocation and closure rules, and 
with relatively few smelters and little prospect of major 
new capacity, the case-by-case scrutiny of State Aid 
support probably provides a reasonable safeguard 
against abuse of the system, and it also affords an 
opportunity to ensure that smelters receiving such 
support adopt the best technologies available, and in 
some circumstances might be tied to the use of low 
carbon electricity. 
Border levelling and ‘carbon 
added’ regulation
The relative homogeneity of aluminium as a product 
would apparently facilitate border levelling, but the 
dependence on electricity – implicitly a wide divergence 
of production processes from a carbon standpoint – 
would require this option to enter new territory to be 
of much relevance. 
Specifically, since ‘best available technology’ would 
include aluminium produced from zero-carbon 
electricity, such a benchmark approach would have 
little impact – either on the predicament of EU 
producers, or on the incentives for foreign producers. 
Yet, aluminium is also produced abroad in very carbon-
intensive ways, based on coal or in some cases natural 
gas. Thus border levelling based on a simple benchmark 
would miss the point. 
Trying unilaterally to discriminate between aluminium 
imports on the basis of point and process of origin would 
be extremely problematic. The only option that might in 
principle really have impact on the problem would be if 
producers tracked the emissions associated with 
aluminium production, and aluminium came with 
certificates indicating the emissions embodied. It would 
in principle then be possible to require importers to buy 
allowances to cover these emissions. An EU-average 
benchmark ‘default’ could be considered, providing an 
incentive for low carbon aluminium producers to provide 
such information. 
Such treatment would be just as relevant for steel in 
principle, but in aluminium there would be far greater 
potential for support from the industry globally, 
encompassing both recycling plants and other low 
carbon producers that could benefit; high carbon 
aluminium producers are economically trivial compared 
to blast furnace steel production. For some smelters in 
developing countries it might even be possible to offer 
international support for them to move towards low 
carbon power sources. 
Such ‘carbon added’ accounting for aluminium  
could represent an important step towards a more 
comprehensive global regulatory structure that provides 
incentives for producers to decarbonise, and information 
enabling consumers and consuming countries to help 
foster this. It relates to a broader debate about the 
balance between production and consumption-based 
approaches to regulating emissions, and the proper 
apportioning of emissions incurred predominately  
in developing countries, but driven largely by Western 
consumption. Such developments are unlikely to happen 
quickly, however.
Conclusions for aluminium 
In general, therefore, the only effective way to reduce 
emissions from aluminium whilst avoiding carbon 
leakage may involve investment support, not so much to 
reimburse new investments for the cost of carbon, but 
rather to ensure that any such subsidies are tied directly 
to investment in low carbon electricity. This is not 
perfect, but if it can help to ensure that additional 
resources are applied to accelerate the growth of low 
carbon power in Europe, the net effect will be positive, 
and it would buy time for the development of fuller 
carbon flows accounting that could genuinely start to 
reward low carbon aluminium producers worldwide.
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US 
US debate has been driven more overtly by concerns 
about competitiveness impacts rather than carbon leakage 
per se, and includes two components that have not been 
significantly considered in Europe, namely output-based 
compensation and border adjustments (BAs).
The latter came to the forefront in the US in 2007; various 
bills proposed in the US Congress have included border 
adjustments, although with different design details.  
While the 2008 Climate Security Act by Senators Boxer, 
Lieberman and Warner contained detailed provisions for 
border adjustments, earlier drafts of the Waxman-Markey 
bill focused more on output-based compensation for trade 
exposed sectors. However, a late amendment re-inserted 
trade provisions which, whilst not as detailed as the earlier 
proposals, were much tougher in proposing that border 
adjustments should come into force automatically by 2020 
unless both the President and Congress determined 
otherwise. Whilst this has alarmed many in the trade 
community, the shaping of the proposed measures is 
much more closely aligned to the problem of carbon 
leakage, rather than protectionist measures, and thus  
in principle has a higher chance of being judged WTO-
compatible. It remains one of the controversial features  
in the bill as it moves from House to Senate consideration, 
but ten Democratic senators whose votes would be 
essential to final passage have indicated they will not 
consider supporting a bill without such measures.
Although it is difficult to predict the particular features  
of any border adjustment provisions that will make it into 
US cap-and-trade legislation, it is reasonable to expect 
that any legislation will include some such provisions. 
However, the provisions concerning border adjustments 
are likely to defer their entry into force for several years, 
during which time there will presumably be negotiations 
between the US and foreign governments in an attempt 
to avoid the actual implementation of the border 
adjustments.
Not all business actors, labour unions and NGOs agree on 
the desirability of border adjustments. Some companies 
fear retaliatory measures if these measures are adopted, 
while other companies are afraid that they will be affected 
because they depend on the import of covered goods. 
Alternatives have been discussed, but none has received 
as much attention as an allowance purchase requirement 
for importers. For example, none of the bills raises the 
option of adopting border tax adjustments. Another 
option that has been raised in the policy discussion is the 
use of output-based export rebates. Finally, one existing 
alternative, the use of transitional assistance to energy-
intensive industries in the form of free allocations of 
allowances has been used as a complementary 
protection measure in many of the bills proposing border 
adjustments. However, free allocation may become more 
important in comparison to border adjustment measures 
because of: 1) the latter’s effect on exporters; 2) the 
difficulty of covering finished products; 3) the uncertainty 
that implementation would be effective; and 4) issues 
related to WTO compliance.
In addition to the factors related to domestic politics, 
progress (or lack thereof) in the UNFCCC negotiations 
could influence the adoption of border adjustment 
measures. If countries like China and India take a positive 
stance in the negotiations and/or agree to taking on some 
kind of corresponding commitment, one of the main 
rationales of border adjustments would be (partially) 
removed. Especially if the President considers that the 
adoption of a unilateral trade measures is a deal-breaker 
in the UNFCCC negotiations, Congress may reconsider 
such a measure. 
Even if a border adjustment provision was included  
in cap-and-trade legislation, the question remains  
what its level of detail would be. One option could be  
to provide sufficient detail on some aspects of the 
provision (e.g. coverage of goods; entry into effect),  
while leaving discretion on important decisions  
(e.g. on comparable action). Furthermore, if the effective 
date were set some years after the bill is enacted, it 
would buy time for the US Administration to conclude 
negotiations with major emitters.
13. Beyond Europe: developments in US 
and Asia-Pacific
The approach to leakage in the EU ETS differs from the approaches under 
consideration in North America and the Asia-Pacific region.
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Japan
A carbon tax was discussed in 2004 and 2005 as a means 
of reaching Japan’s Kyoto target, but not implemented. 
The impact assessment conducted by the relevant 
authorities fuelled fears of negative impacts on the 
competitiveness of Japanese industries; the steel and 
ceramics industries were assessed to incur the highest 
financial burden amounting to 1.9% and 0.7% of total 
production cost for a tax of 3.400 JPY/tC (equivalent to 
approximately €7/tCO2). The Japanese Emissions Trading 
Scheme (JETS), launched in October 2008, could build an 
alternate basis for mandatory carbon pricing.
The Japanese steel and cement sectors are big emitters, 
ranking third and fourth compared to the same sectors in 
other countries. Other sectors facing similar production 
cost increases include pulp and paper producers (0.7%) 
as well as producers of oil and coal products (0.5%), 
thought these are not traded so intensively. Some 
energy-intensive products, such as aluminium, are not 
even produced in Japan and the migration of power 
production is not an issue as electricity interconnectors 
with neighbouring countries are unlikely given the 
distances involved.
Overall, steel is the dominant industry and is likely to 
define the Japanese stance on tackling carbon leakage.  
Its main platform to date has been to oppose mandatory 
cap-and-trade constraints, arguing that it is already the 
world’s most efficient steel industry and has delivered  
on emission targets previously negotiated with the 
government. Tentative consideration of border 
adjustment options was dropped in the light of assessed 
difficulties and the lack of significant carbon cost drivers. 
However, the overall situation may change rapidly with 
the new government elected in September 2009, which 
represents a break with the 50-year dominance of the 
Liberal Democratic Party, and which within a couple  
of weeks of its election had declared a much more 
ambitious Japanese emissions target for 2020. As a 
result, the new government is bound to face intense 
pressure as to how this can be achieved without 
damaging the Japanese manufacturing industry.
Australia and South Korea
The severity and vulnerability of Australia’s climatic 
conditions have helped to make climate change a 
top-level political issue, but it is unique as a country 
actively pursuing a cap-and-trade system whose 
economy is oriented towards energy-intensive exports. 
The option of ignoring impacts on such exports, which 
makes sense in the context of a European economy that 
has no natural advantage in resource-based industries,  
is untenable in Australia.
The government’s Commonwealth Pollution Reduction 
Scheme (CPRS) provides output-linked free allocations  
of permits to the most energy-intensive industries. The 
baseline used for the output calculations will be historic 
industry averages. Free permit allocations are to be 
provided in relation to both direct emissions and indirect 
emissions from electricity. The most emissions-intensive 
industries will initially receive 94.5% of allowances for 
free, while moderately emissions-intensive industries 
will receive 66%. The level of free allocation will reduce 
each year by 1.3%. 
As the other OECD country in the region, South Korea has 
indicated that it is willing to take on mandatory emissions 
targets in the next round of global negotiations and is 
working actively on designing an emissions trading 
scheme as part of a comprehensive environmental  
policy. However, as an equally manufacturing-intensive 
economy, it will face some of the same challenges,  
and design is not far advanced. 
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China
The Chinese perspective obviously is very different,  
as a major exporter that is not expecting to adopt  
cap-and-trade commitments for some years (though 
Chinese analysts are already examining the options).  
Its main concern in the area is with the possible 
protectionist sentiment, particularly in the US, hijacking 
climate change concerns in ways that raise barriers  
to Chinese exports. 
Chinese nervousness about the issue is, however, 
tempered by several other considerations. It is  
concerned about climate change and is keen to find  
some accommodation that could assist a global deal.  
Its economic strategy is oriented more toward 
manufacturing than primary commodities; indeed China 
is not a major exporter of most primary commodities, 
finding itself frequently importing them to supply its 
manufacturing base. Measures that reduce competing 
Western demand for such commodities are thus not 
necessarily anathema to China. Moreover, China has on 
several occasions implemented export taxes on energy-
intensive commodity exports, to deter exports that could 
overheat the economy and drive up domestic prices. 
Finally, China has expressed concern about being blamed 
for emissions that are incurred in manufacturing goods 
for export to the West, and suggested that such 
emissions should actually be attributed to consumers, 
not producers. This in effect would imply a transfer of 
emissions not unlike requirements for importers into  
ETS systems to buy emission allowances. 
Such positions are not universally shared across 
developing countries, but suggest a more nuanced 
picture about the politics than often assumed. Moreover, 
the simple fact that border adjustments by importers 
would raise revenues, could well lead developing 
countries to engage in discussion about the options if the 
revenues associated with imposing such adjustments 
could instead be used to contribute to the global effort  
to tackle climate change. 
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14. Conclusions
Maintaining an effective incentive for manufacturing industry to decarbonise 
whilst preventing carbon leakage entails a difficult balancing act. The long-term 
objective to ‘level up’ carbon costs globally is just that – a long-term objective. 
It does not obviate the need to develop effective policies in a world of unequal 
carbon prices, which is likely to be the case at minimum for the next decade and 
probably much longer. 
This reality does raise the question of how decisions now 
can not only maintain incentives on our own industries, 
but also support efforts to broaden and deepen the 
scope of carbon pricing, and avoid getting locked into 
‘levelling down’ as the only solution for traded industries.
Our quantified analysis – combined with policies that  
are already in place and others under consideration – 
suggest that the leakage and competitive impacts  
of the ETS will be much lower than some industries 
fear. Concerns about potential leakage in East European 
power generation appear largely unfounded. The scale  
of leakage we estimate from some of the most impacted 
manufacturing industries even without any exemption  
or protection does not negate the fundamental 
contribution of the EU ETS to reducing EU carbon 
emissions. Governments should not over-react to the 
challenge, and the current EU classification of ‘sectors  
at risk’ can reasonably be described as generous to the 
point of excess. 
For sectors so identified, the choice between levelling 
down/free allocation, and maintaining incentives through 
border levelling, is partly a balance between political 
feasibility and economic ideals. This is underlined by 
Chart 14a, which brings together the impact of the 
various options modelled on both carbon leakage and 
the carbon price required to achieve the EU’s present 
target. Free allocation is unambiguously both more 
costly and less effective at tackling leakage; the ideal 
border levelling mechanisms have little effect on carbon 
prices but can turn carbon leakage into positive leverage 
that reduces emissions elsewhere. 
This, however, is at present purely theoretical, and does 
not correspond to the political reality of most industries 
and regions pressing for free allocation, and concerned 
about the complexities and risks of border levelling. 
Our most central conclusion is that rather than engage 
in an almost ideological and highly politicised battle on 
the generalities, the way forward lies in considering 
pragmatically the effectiveness and feasibility of specific 
options for the key sectors of concern. 
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Implications for business
The policy approach of handing out generous free 
allocation does not necessarily shield these industries 
from all consequences: carbon costs will still affect 
operational decisions and the longevity of free allocation 
is unlikely to be assured on timescales relevant to key 
investments, and generous treatments are unlikely to be 
sustainable as overall caps decline. Moreover, the rest of 
business pays a price in terms of higher carbon prices 
required to achieve any given target, if the biggest 
emitters are shielded in this way. Whatever form it takes, 
businesses will undoubtedly face increasing carbon 
constraints internationally over time. 
Thus whatever the approach to carbon leakage, investing 
in cleaner production is paramount for businesses to stay 
competitive if their operation is energy-intensive and 
international, whilst carbon price differentials will remain 
a challenge due to the slow process of establishing 
national ETSs and of step-by-step linking and alignment 
of the systems. The focus of responses should be on the 
limited number of sectors where carbon cost impacts are 
high, and steel, cement and aluminium are conspicuous 
in this regard. For such sectors, the most effective 
approaches will reflect the actual role of carbon costs in 
operation and investment decisions, and constructive 
engagement between business and government is likely 
to lead to better and more predictable outcomes. The 
analysis shows there is no ‘one-size fits all’ solution. 
Moreover, a lock-in of measures against carbon leakage 
over the long term could be counterproductive. While 
industry needs a reliable policy environment, the carbon 
pricing issue is dynamic. One government or region 
alone will not be able to deliver stability or certainty  
of international prices for industries, which compete  
in the international markets. Business needs to support 
multilateral arrangements to address the issues.
Principles for policy
Policy needs centrally to deal with trade-offs between 
choices, but three common principles can be observed. 
1. Strive to maintain carbon price signals within an 
emission trading system. ‘Levelling down’ needs to 
maintain as much of the carbon incentive as possible; 
this implies benchmarks for free allocation, or investment 
subsidies complemented with conditions that relate to 
technological performance. The signal sent to industry 
should be that policymakers take the carbon leakage 
issue seriously, but will not adopt generic exemptions 
that conserve high-carbon production structures.
2. Maintain transparency. Free allocation with benchmarks 
should not include too many benchmarks; border levelling 
should be applied only to homogeneous products at the 
lower end of the value chain; investment subsidies should 
be carefully governed against a clear set of criteria (as 
under EU State Aid legislation).
3. Make approaches consistent with international 
developments. Leakage reduces environmental 
effectiveness; free allocation risks potential for a subsidy 
race as once more emissions trading systems emerge 
around the world; border levelling is complex, potentially 
disruptive and most effective when fully cooperative. 
Thus the principle of coordinated approaches for ETS 
design is added to the list, for all the options. 
Whilst preserving these general principles, the most 
appropriate way of implementing them differs by sector. 
Applications of the screening process represented by 
Chart 9a yields quite different assessments of the 
relative advantages/disadvantages of the policy tools 
for each industry. A policy approach that is generalised 
across industry sectors and is not tailored to the 
conditions of specific industries will not be cost-effective 
and could be counter-productive. 
The box opposite summarises how these principles apply 
for the instruments mapped out in Chart 9a and to the 
sectors in this study.
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The core conclusion of this study is that effective policy 
needs to adapt to the characteristics of different sectors, 
which can be usefully grouped into four main types. 
Highly trade-intensive sectors with relatively low  
direct and indirect cost exposures, which may still  
be classified as ‘at risk of carbon leakage’ under the  
EC proposals:
•	 Any residual impacts on such ‘trade but not carbon-
cost-intensive’ sectors can be addressed by reducing 
other costs the businesses face (e.g. corporate or 
labour taxes), with any Treasury revenue losses 
being offset by auction revenues.
•	 There is no case for invoking border levelling 
until costs become far more substantial.
Sectors with high indirect carbon costs (very electricity-
intensive) which also tend to be capital-intensive: 
•	 Direct investment support, funded from auction 
revenues and subject to case-by-case State Aid 
scrutiny, offers the best option for aluminium 
smelters, and possibly electric arc steel. Auction 
revenues and policies should be targeted to support 
low carbon electricity investments and research, 
development & deployment.
•	 The wide range of CO2e intensities of electricity 
production across and within countries means  
that costs cannot feasibly be adjusted at the border 
without extensive international cooperation to 
establish verified ‘carbon added’ content of the 
product, which should be a core goal of future 
multilateral negotiations.
Sectors with high direct carbon costs (very carbon-
intensive) that are also capital-intensive may be 
addressed transitionally through allocation decisions  
but this carries drawbacks that accumulate over time:
•	 Free allocation for blast furnace steel production  
is a viable mid-term fix to retain capital investment 
and jobs, provided allocations are benchmarked.  
It risks creating perverse incentives that not only 
reduce the overall efficiency of emissions trading 
(thus raising costs to other industries) but can also 
‘over-subsidise’, leading to windfall profits or 
retention of old plants that could be more efficiently 
replaced by new investment, here or overseas.
•	 The strategic goal should thus be to use the time 
bought by free allocation to negotiate and 
implement WTO-compatible border levelling 
appropriate to the key product classes.
Sectors with high direct carbon costs that are less 
capital-intensive cannot reliably be addressed by free 
allocation, but GATT-constrained border levelling is 
relatively straightforward particularly where products 
and processes are relatively homogenous:
•	 Fixed free allocation may not deter operational 
leakage, and output-based allocation would need  
to focus on the most carbon-intensive part of the 
production chain (e.g. clinker production in cement) 
which may seriously degrade economic efficiency  
and undermine incentives to radical innovation.
•	 Border levelling based on ‘best available 
technology’ benchmarks for cement are clearly 
consistent with existing GATT constraints and offer  
a far more appropriate policy response, basically 
analogous to excise taxes; policy should focus on 
negotiations to gain acceptance of and implement 
such measures. 
Experience of adopting appropriate policies in this way 
will also help to lay groundwork for factoring in carbon 
costs more widely over time, which should be the 
ultimate goal of current efforts to establish emission 
trading schemes. 
Recommended approach to adapting policy to industry characteristics
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*Countries with cap-and-trade (implemented or planned)
Source: Climate Strategies (2009): Dröge, S. et al., Tackling Leakage in a World of Unequal Carbon Prices, Cambridge, UK, available from:  
www.climatestrategies.org
Applying a multilateral approach
The need for a multilateral approach does not imply that 
all steps have to be hostage to global negotiations under 
the UN. This is emphasised by Chart 14b, which shows for 
a number of key sectors the principal trade partners. Just 
six countries represent a huge share of the EU’s trade 
relations in these sectors. One (Norway) is already linked 
in the EU ETS and another (Switzerland) is expected to, 
whilst the US is itself developing cap-and-trade 
legislation. The EU’s numerous ties with Turkey provide  
a helpful political context for negotiations on appropriate 
measures. This would leave core and cross-cutting 
negotiating challenges focusing particularly on two major 
powers, namely Russia and China, plus smaller countries 
important in particular sectors (such as the role of Ukraine 
in steel, and Mozambique in aluminium). Negotiations 
that focus first upon such major trade partners could not 
provide a satisfactory global solution, but they could 
unblock the most likely sources of political challenges  
to effective action. 
The aim would be to secure full multilateral agreements 
that offer a way to resolve, at least partially, carbon 
leakage and competitiveness issues. This agenda will 
need to craft the combination of facilitating appropriate 
measures, but also act to restrain the impulse to 
unilateral action which can prompt hostile reactions on 
the part of trade partners, are more likely to provoke 
challenges under WTO rules, and exacerbate 
administrative complexities in their implementation.
Therefore governments should pursue multilateral 
agreements that define the scope of appropriate action 
and restrict the use of unilateral measures to address 
competitiveness and leakage concerns. These 
multilateral agreements should include both 
environmental and trade agreements and incorporate 
both leakage and competitiveness issues. 
Such a multilateral approach also holds the key to the 
possibility of addressing the ‘free rider’ problem, which 
is not possible without exemptions to general GATT 
principles of non-discrimination. These would need to be 
agreed amongst a wide body of countries, building upon 
bilateral and regional agreements, to help foster action in 
countries that hold out against broadly agreed progress 
in tackling climate change. Through this route, the world 
can indeed move towards the final level of action set out 
in Chart 6a – broad-based action which factors in carbon 
costs across all key sectors in all the world’s major 
economies. But we can only get there if countries first 
work out the transitional path for sustaining and 
expanding action in a world of unequal carbon prices. 
Chart 14b EU’s major non-EU-trade partners in selected energy-intensive sectors: ranking
USA* Russia China Norway* Switzerland* Turkey
Aluminium 4 2 6 1 3
Basic iron & steel and 
ferro-alloys
4 2 3 6 1
Other basic inorganic 
chemicals
1 4 2 3 (7)
Fertilizers & nitrogen 
compounds
3 1 2
Paper & paperboard 1 3 5 4 2 6
Cement 4 6 1 2
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